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INTRODUCTION 
This Article provides a descriptive and normative 
exploration of the prophylactic remedy. The prophylactic 
remedy imposes specific measures directing defendant's 
legal conduct affiliated with the proven wrong to prevent 
future harm.1 Federal courts have utilized prophylactic 
remedies for over forty years.2 Prophylaxis has become the 
remedy of choice for violations of intangible rights 
protecting constitutional, personal, and community values 
because of its effectiveness in preventing harm that is 
otherwise difficult to redress.3 However, prophylactic 
remedies remain amorphous, unknown concepts in the eyes 
of most lawyers and academics. Few legal treatises or 
casebooks mention prophylaxis, and those that do obfuscate 
rather than clarify the understanding of prophylaxis.4 The 
Supreme Court has often endorsed prophylactic remedial 
 
1.  See ELAINE W. SHOBEN & WILLIAM MURRAY TABB, REMEDIES: CASES AND 
PROBLEMS 246 (2d ed. 1995); Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic 
Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 343, 344-45 (2002) [hereinafter Prophylactic Remedies]. 
2. The first example of the imposition of a remedy of prophylactic character 
was in 1963 in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 
(1963). There the Supreme Court upheld a preliminary, prophylactic injunction 
to prevent securities fraud requiring an investment advisor to disclose to his 
clients his own personal dealings in securities recommended to the clients. Id. 
at 193; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 457 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("Indeed, the United States argues that '[p]rophylactic rules are now 
and have been for many years a feature of this Court's constitutional 
adjudication.' That statement is not wholly inaccurate, if by 'many years' one 
means since the mid-1960's.") (alteration in the original) (citing Brief for the 
United States at 47); Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: 
The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1999) 
("My review of the case law reveals a long history of judicial creation of 
prophylactic rules, but a lack of self-conscious judicial examination of their 
legitimacy."). 
3. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding 
prophylactic remedy in abortion protest case); Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of 
Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (imposing extensive prophylactic 
remedies to address inequality, sexual harassment, and unconstitutional 
conditions in women's prisoners).  See also cases discussed infra pp. 121-22, 
170-74 and accompanying text; Landsberg, supra note 2, at 930 (noting that 
"prophylactic rules have become increasingly popular with the judicial" branch 
because they provide a maximal remedy, effectively achieve the desired 
resulted, and simply enforcement of constitutional values). 
4. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 282-89 (3d ed. 2002); DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE 131-34 (3d ed. 2002); SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at 246. 
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decrees, yet as in the case of most remedial decisions, has 
omitted explanation of the principles, parameters, and 
theoretical justifications for the equitable remedy.5 
This Article attempts to fill this theoretical and 
doctrinal void. The primary aim of the Article is to enable 
courts, lawyers, and scholars to understand the reality of 
the prophylactic remedies that are available and frequently 
ordered against defendants. The second, more ambitious 
goal of this Article, is to create the doctrinal and theoretical 
basis to dispel the prevailing belief that prophylaxis is 
merely the arbitrary, personal activism of the individual 
judge.6 
The existing construct of prophylaxis dominating the 
scholarship is one of unprincipled judicial activism.7 
Prophylaxis has been conceptualized by its opponents,8 as 
 
5. In addition, only a few scholarly articles have addressed the principles or 
doctrinal parameters of a prophylactic remedy in the forty years since its 
inception. See Landsberg, supra note 2, at 926-27 (discussing judicial 
prophylactic "rules" not directly sanctioned or required by the Constitution that 
are adopted to ensure that the government follows constitutionally required 
rules); David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to 
Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 
671-82 (1988) (discussing the court's ability to give more than the plaintiff's 
rightful position through prophylactic relief when necessary to remedy the 
violation). 
6. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 133 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
("I believe that we must impose more precise standards and guidelines on the 
federal equitable power, not only to restore predictability to the law and reduce 
judicial discretion, but also to ensure that constitutional remedies are actually 
targeted toward those who have been injured."); Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 
629-30 ("Without principles to guide the exercise of equitable discretion, the 
judge acts as a policy maker in framing the remedy, which throws into question 
the legitimacy of the judicial power to grant [prophylactic remedies]."). 
7. See generally Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: 
A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100 (1985) (arguing that 
prophylactic rules in the criminal and constitutional context are illegitimate 
exercises of judicial power); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's 
Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
1121 (1996) (constituting the classic modern work arguing that structural and 
prophylactic injunctions violate principles of judicial restraint). 
8. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the imposition of a "Court-made code" upon Congress 
and the States); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 741 (1969) (Black, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing prophylactic rule of case 
as "pure legislation if there ever was legislation"); cf. WILLIAM LASSER, THE 
LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 222-43 
(1988) (describing former Attorney General Edwin Meese's criticism of the 
modern Court as being "in the habit of deciding cases based upon what they 
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well as by some proponents,9 as judicial policymaking or 
lawmaking by which the judge in public law litigation 
accomplishes the "social good" of preserving constitutional 
values by imposing her own views upon the defendant.10 
Even the first academics to endorse prophylaxis in concept, 
if not by name, adopted the judicial activism construct to 
describe the types of injunctive remedies emerging from the 
courts.11 However, this notion of judges as dictators of social 
policy and the managers of governmental institutions raises 
institutional concerns of separation of powers and 
federalism.12 Commentators have attacked the competency 
 
think 'constitutes sound public policy,' rather than on 'a deference to what the 
Constitution – its text and intention – may demand.'") (quoting Elder Witt, A 
Different Justice: Reagan and the Supreme Court, CONG. Q. 176 (1986)); Alfred 
M. Mamlet, Reconsideration of Separation of Powers and the Bargaining Game: 
Limiting the Policy Discretion of Judges and Plaintiffs in Institutional Suits, 33 
EMORY L. J. 685, 685-86 (1985) (arguing that courts' issuance of affirmative 
injunctions addressing subsidiary policy problems related to the legal violation 
is an exercise of legislative or executive discretion which belongs to majoritarian 
bodies). 
9. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 1-25 
(1998) (arguing that judges do and should engage in judicial policy making and 
describing such policy making in the context of prison reform litigation); Abram 
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1302 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
2 (1979) [hereinafter Justice]; Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge 
Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2010, 2011 (1997). But see Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 671 (disagreeing 
that judges engage in extra-judicial policy making when imposing prophylactic 
relief). 
10. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 5 ("Policy making, by a judge or 
anyone else, is the process by which officials exercise power on the basis of their 
judgment that their actions will produce socially desirable results . . . . [while] 
interpretation . . . is the process by which public officials exercise power on the 
basis of a preexisting legal source that they regard as authoritative."). 
11. See Chayes, supra note 9; Justice, supra note 9. 
12. See Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal 
Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978); Thomas, Prophylactic 
Remedies, supra note 1, at 362-64 (summarizing the institutional criticisms of 
prophylactic relief); cf. Colin Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker, 65 VA. 
L. REV. 43, 89 (1979) ("Nevertheless, despite the ease with which we may view 
the judge as occasional social policymaker or community conscience, the 
prospect of a judge intervening actively in governmental politics offends 
cherished images of the judicial function. The role of powerbroker implies a 
degree of partisanship, manipulation, and guesswork offensive to accepted 
judicial virtues of neutrality, passivity, and objectivity. Moreover, it sanctions a 
degree of judicial intrusion into the political process that conflicts sharply with 
values inherent in federalism and separation of powers."); Ernest A. Young, 
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and legitimacy of courts to impose prophylactic measures 
that create new legal obligations of public import outside 
the democratic process of the legislature.13 
This Article disagrees with the argument that remedial 
decisionmaking is policymaking somehow different from the 
accepted authority of the court to make decisions about fact 
or law, and therefore illegitimate.14 Other commentators as 
well have concluded that prophylactic remedies are a 
legitimate use of the judicial power.15 The point of this 
 
Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1142-43 
(2002) (defining judicial activism as a concern over the institutional role of the 
judge in relation to other actors in the system). The separation of powers 
concerns are that in imposing prophylactic relief the court oversteps its Article 
III authority to decide cases only by engaging in policymaking extrinsic to the 
litigation and in so doing displaces the legislature's designated and more 
appropriate expertise in policymaking through a democratic forum. See 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 454 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing adoption of prophylactic rules "flagrantly offends fundamental 
principles of separation of powers, and arrogates to [the Court] prerogatives 
reserved to the representatives of the people"). The federalism concerns arise 
out of the picture of the federal court directing the conduct of state institutions 
through injunctive commands. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 384-88 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
13. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 173-98 (1993) 
(attacking legitimacy of the prophylactic rule of Miranda); LASSER, supra note 8, 
at 222-26; Grano, supra note 7, at 105; Nagel, supra note 12, at 661; Thomas 
Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1127-29 (1978) (suggesting that prophylactic rulemaking 
invades congressional power to legislate and executive powers to define law 
enforcement methods and violates federal judicial power to displace state law); 
Yoo, supra note 7, at 1151-70. But see Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra 
note 1, at 374-80 (arguing that prophylaxis is a legitimate exercise of the 
federal judiciary’s Article III power); accord Landsberg, supra note 2, at 926 . 
14. See Honorable William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial 
Activism, Address at the George Washington University National Law Center 
(Mar. 10, 1992), in 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1992) ("The propriety of a 
detailed remedy comes from the judicial office itself. The Supreme Court has 
said, time and again, that once a constitutional violation is found, a federal 
court is required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the nature and extent of 
the injury. Similar to its duty to say what the law is, a court's obligation to 
ensure full compliance with the law is nothing new.") [hereinafter "Justice 
Speech"]; Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 360-80. 
15. See Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of "Prophylactic" 
Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002); Landsberg, supra note 2, at 949-63 (arguing 
the prophylactic rules, including prophylactic injunctions, are supported by the 
general Marbury power and the "nature of our constitution [and] the nature of 
courts"); Henry Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. 
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Article, however, is to reveal the inaccuracy of the 
assumptions about prophylaxis upon which these criticisms 
are based. Revealing the inaccuracy of the foundational 
assumptions supporting these politicized criticisms of public 
law injunctions begins to erode the existing academic and 
political bias against such commonly-used judicial 
remedies. The launching points for the attacks on the 
legitimacy of prophylactic relief are the allegations that the 
judicial response is unprincipled, unpredictable, and 
unconstrained by the rule of law.16 None of these 
allegations prove true. To the contrary, this Article's review 
of prophylaxis and the way in which it has been utilized by 
judges of all political stripes for nearly half a century 
demonstrates that prophylaxis operates under precise 
doctrinal principles formulating consistent standards by 
which it is cautiously imposed when necessary.17 
The existing case law reveals common trans-
substantive remedial principles guiding the courts in their 
 
REV. 1, 2-3 (1975) (finding judicial authority for prophylactic rules in 
constitutional cases from the "constitutional common law" comprised of a series 
of remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from various 
constitutional provisions); Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 671; David A. Strauss, 
The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988) (arguing 
that prophylactic "rules" are not exceptional measures of questionable 
legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law); cf. 
Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 
SUP. CT. REV. 71, 73 n.47 (stating there is consensus that prophylaxis is 
legitimate and the reason is no longer important). 
16. See LASSER, supra note 8, at 222-26. 
17. Cf. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 19 ("The prison cases represented 
the collective actions of literally hundreds of federal judges, acting individually. 
These judges were not fire-breathing radicals, or the minions of an occupying 
foreign power; they were not captured by some narrow special interest group, 
nor did they meet in secret conclave to concoct their plans. They were middle-of-
the-road, upper-middle-class Americans, largely white and male, appointed by 
Republican and Democratic presidents. They did not even take their cues from 
the Supreme Court, the usual villain for critics of judicial activism . . . . There 
was no Brown, Miranda, or Roe v. Wade to generate a sudden shift in doctrine 
and provide the explanation that a few idiosyncratic individuals had exercised 
their will . . . . If these cases represented such a wholesale violation of true 
principles for constraining judicial behavior, why were so many federal judges 
willing to decide them, and with such apparent unanimity? . . . . Although much 
of this literature has merit [challenging public remedies as violative of 
separation of powers], its frequent conclusion that the federal judges 
overstepped their authority is somewhat implausible. It is implausible that so 
large a group of government officials, in so many different regions, acting 
independently of one another over such an extended period of time, would stray 
so far from the accepted path."). 
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choice of prophylaxis and unified theories supporting the 
legitimacy of the remedy.18 Discerning these core principles 
and rules for prophylactic relief demonstrates, perhaps for 
the first time, that a common remedy with overarching 
remedial rules is at play in each of these cases of 
prophylaxis. The establishment of trans-substantive 
remedial principles has been one of the key goals of modern 
remedies scholarship as the law of remedies has been too 
often compartmentalized as specific rules limited by the 
nature of the claim.19 This holdover from the English 
common law writ system in which right and remedy were 
intertwined in the particular writ requested has delayed 
the development of an advanced understanding of the law 
of remedies.20 For what has become apparent is that there 
are in fact common remedial rules that apply in all cases 
 
18. The principles that emerge are trans-substantive in the sense that they 
transcend the particular substantive type of claim at issue in the case and 
instead apply equally to all cases involving the application of prophylactic relief. 
As Professor Schoenbrod has noted, "the transsubstantive principles of 
remedies are sometimes not well stated in the case law or recognized in the 
various research aids that lawyers use. This makes it particularly difficult for 
lawyers who have not studied remedies or who have done so in a 'cookbook' 
fashion to locate or apply the law that they need to help their clients. They are 
unable, for instance, to deal with a novel remedies question by drawing 
appropriate analogies to remedies from other substantive areas of the law." 
SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 3. However, the Supreme Court's approach to 
public law remedies is generally transsubstantive, as principles applied in one 
area are applied in other contexts as well. Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court 
and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 475, 
507 (1999). 
19. See Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 631-32. For discussions of the trans-
substantive tradition in remedies literature, see SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 3 
("[R]emedies – like civil procedure, administrative law, evidence, or conflicts of 
law—is 'transsubstantive': the problems it addresses arise in all substantive 
areas of law. Although the substantive law affects how remedies issues are 
resolved, just as the substantive law affects the outcome of procedural or 
evidentiary questions, this issues themselves are universal."); see also DOUGLAS 
LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991); Gene Shreve, 
The Premature Burial of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1063, 1070 
(1992) (reviewing Laycock's article favorably with respect to its assertion of 
trans-substantive rules of remedies). 
20. See Dean Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 
26-27 (1905) (calling compartmentalization on injunctive relief "the decadence 
of equity" because the purpose of equity's flexibility gets lost in subject-specific 
rules); Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 632, 654 (arguing that recognition of trans-
substantive principles for measuring injunctive relief will assist judges in 
identifying relevant issues and arguments and in making decisions on the basis 
of principle rather than policy). 
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just as there are common procedural rules that apply 
regardless of the nature of the claim.21 Never has the 
problem been more apparent than in the context of 
prophylaxis where commentators have confined the 
discussion of prophylaxis to the narrow, ancillary contexts 
of Miranda22 and First Amendment overbreadth.23 
In support of the trans-substantive theory of remedies, 
this Article will begin in Part I by identifying the principles 
 
21. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly 
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantive Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2067-68 (1989); Robert M. Cover, 
For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 
718 (1975); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989). 
However, the debate regarding the general or specific applicability of rules of 
procedure has moved from claim specific, to trans-substantive, and back to 
claim specific. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: 
Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1030 (2000) 
(noting that "the enthusiasm in the 1930s for trans-substantive rules has given 
way to a preference for rules distinguishing among cases," and providing 
examples of prison litigation, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000), securities litigation, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000), complex litigation, and habeas litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 
2254 (2000)). But see Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 551 (2002) (arguing against subject-specific procedure changes that 
jeopardize the essence of trans-substantive rules of procedure). 
22. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 15; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial 
Legitimacy and the Unwritten Constitution: A Comment on Miranda and 
Dickerson, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119 (2001-02); Grano, supra note 7; David 
Huitema, Miranda: Legitimate Response to Contingent Requirements of the Fifth 
Amendment, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 261 (2000); Susan R. Klein, Identifying 
and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights 
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030 (2001); Richard 
H.W. Maloy, Can a Rule be Prophylactic and Yet Constitutional?, 27 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 2465 (2001); David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and 
Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958 (2001); Strauss, supra note 15. In the context of 
prophylaxis, Miranda can be viewed at its more general level as a case about 
constitutional law broadly, encompassing both criminal and civil rights, rather 
than narrowly as a case about criminal rights. 
23. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment 
Overbreadth, and Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31 
(2003) (criticizing the Court's decision in Hill v. Colorado upholding 
prophylactic legislation that restricted the free speech rights of anti-abortion 
protests); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 
853 (1991) (describing a prophylactic theory of First Amendment overbreadth); 
Melissa L. Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious 
Districting, 109 YALE L. J. 1603 (2000); Daniel P. Tokaji, Political Equality After 
Bush v. Gore: A First Amendment Approach to Voting Rights, in THE FINAL 
ARBITER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH V. GORE IN LAW AND POLITICS 
(forthcoming SUNY Press). 
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of prophylactic relief demarcating its unique character and 
scope.24 These rules, derived from the existing Supreme 
Court case law, define prophylaxis as injunctive relief 
composed of measures directing the legal conduct of 
defendant that contributes to the established harm. The 
prophylactic measures address facilitators of the harm or 
its prevention, and typically include specific measures 
requiring polices, training, monitoring, notice, or process.25 
However, the court's ability to impose broad injunctive 
relief reaching defendant's affiliated legal conduct beyond 
the illegal action itself is not unlimited. Prophylactic 
remedies have been upheld only where the enjoining of 
affiliated conduct is necessary to achieve the aim of 
remedying an illegality.26 The measures included in 
prophylaxis have also been restricted to including affiliated 
conduct only where that conduct has a sufficient causal 
nexus to the legal harm.27 This nexus is demonstrated by 
showing that the affiliated conduct shares a corresponding 
factual issue with the illegality and that the relationship is 
sufficiently close to justify its inclusion in the relief as 
measured by common notions of foreseeability and 
proximate cause.28 
These limitations on prophylactic remedies gleaned 
from the case law requiring both proper means and ends 
become clearer when compared to the analogous limitations 
imposed by the Court in the related area of prophylactic 
legislation.29 "Prophylactic legislation" is legislation passed 
by Congress pursuant to its remedial power under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizing Congress to 
enforce constitutional rights.30 As in the case of judicial 
remedies, the Court has endorsed the use of broad 
prophylactic legislation to prevent complex legal problems 
 
24. See infra Part I. 
25. See infra Part I.B. 
26. See infra Part I.C.1. 
27. See infra Part I.C.2. 
28. See infra Part I.C.2. 
29. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see infra text 
accompanying notes 150-62 & 206-26. 
30. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003) 
("Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially 
constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional 
conduct."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). 
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by proscribing facially legal conduct.31 However, just as 
with judicial remedies, legislative prophylaxis has been 
limited to statutes that target a legal harm and regulate 
legal conduct that is causally linked to the harm. 32 Without 
a restriction on the means and ends of prophylactic 
legislation, the congressional remedial power becomes a 
catchall power that usurps the limits of the remedial power 
designated in Section 5.33 That is, an unrestrained 
legislative remedial power poses the same institutional 
concerns as unrestricted judicial remedial power in that 
both threaten to reach beyond the institutional actor's 
constitutional authority into the realm of a separate branch 
of government.34 
 
31. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 ("Congress is not confined to the enactment of 
legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but may prohibit a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including 
that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text."); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) ("Section 5 is a positive grant of legislative 
power that includes authority to prohibi[t] conduct which is not itself 
unconstitutional and [to] intrud[e] into legislative spheres of autonomy 
previously reserved to the States.") (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) ("Congress' power 
'to enforce' the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter 
violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader 
swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the 
Amendment's text."); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 ("Legislation which deters 
or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' 
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself 
unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously 
reserved to the States.'") (citation omitted). 
32. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619 ("However, as broad as the congressional 
enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.") (citations omitted); Kimel, 528 U.S. 
at 81 ("Nevertheless, we have also recognized that the same language that 
serves as the basis for the affirmative grant of congressional power also serves 
to limit that power."). 
33.  See Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of 
Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 487 (1999) ("If Congress were permitted to enact rules 
that it calls 'prophylactic' without any proportionality review, it could increase 
its power under Section 5 geometrically."); Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 
5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 727 (2001) 
[hereinafter Remedial Rights]. 
34. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and 
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945 (2003) (noting that "[t]he Rehnquist Court now 
views Section 5 power as a potential threat to the Court's role as the ultimate 
expositor of the constitutional text.") (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
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After delineating the character and breadth of 
prophylaxis, this Article will then in Part II, explore the 
emerging principles of law governing the appropriate use of 
judicial discretion to select prophylactic relief.35 Two 
principles of the appropriate use of equitable discretion to 
impose prophylactic relief emerge from the existing body of 
cases. First, courts order prophylactic relief generally as a 
remedy of last resort.36 Defendants are given the first 
opportunity to remedy the harm by action or remedial 
plan.37 Only where prophylaxis is necessary because other 
remedies including the defendants' own self-help have 
failed or are likely to fail have courts selected the powerful 
prophylactic remedy from among the arsenal of remedial 
weapons. Even then, courts are careful to evaluate the 
necessity of directing each specific action to ensure that the 
restriction of legal conduct does not unfairly trample upon 
defendants' legal rights or institutional concerns. Second, 
courts are limited in selecting prophylactic relief by the 
evidence and arguments presented in the remedial 
process.38 The judge may not make up the prophylactic 
remedy out of whole cloth, but instead must solicit factual 
and legal inputs on the remedial question and then confine 
the remedial result to the established record. While the 
judge is able to use problem solving skills to creatively 
address complex legal problems, she may not deviate from 
the established record in imposing relief. 
Finally, Part III of this Article answers the theoretical 
question of why prophylactic remedies are necessary, and 
indeed integral, to remedying legal rights.39 The necessity 
of prophylactic relief stems from both a theoretical and 
instrumental function. At the theoretical level, prophylactic 
measures are able to provide tangible meaning to otherwise 
abstract rights by using its specificity to define those rights 
by example.40 To define the color red, one might use 
examples of a tomato, blood, a cherry or a ruby to 
demonstrate the meaning by specific illustration.41 So too, 
 
35. See infra Part II. 
36. See infra Part II.A. 
37. See infra Part II.A. 
38. See infra Part II.B. 
39. See infra Part III. 
40. See infra Part III.A. 
41. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 
2000), available at http://www.bartleby.com [hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE 
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the prophylactic remedy illustrates the abstract meaning of 
legal rights and thereby promotes a tangible understanding 
of the contours of those rights. The specificity of prophylaxis 
also fulfills a functional necessity of the court's enforcement 
of legal rights. The specificity and regulation of affiliated 
conduct avoids the defendants' resistance to conforming to 
the legal right, provides the defendants with clear notice of 
what compliance is required, and facilitates the court's 
ability to monitor that compliance.42 Thus, the prophylactic 
remedy occupies a unique position in the law providing the 
courts with a powerful option to redress legal problems. 
I. THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF PROPHYLACTIC RELIEF 
The prophylactic remedy is as distinctive in character 
as its name. The name, given to the remedy by the Supreme 
Court, often evokes giggles from law students hearing of the 
remedy for the first time.43 The common dictionary 
definition of the word means to "take precautions against" 
or "to keep guard before."44 It is this notion of prevention 
that is at the core of the legal definition of the term 
"prophylactic." Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"prophylactic" as an adjective meaning "formulated to 
prevent something."45 This definition mirrors the use of the 
term in medicine to describe measures taken to prevent 
disease.46 For example, prescriptive drugs may be given 
 
DICTIONARY]; WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 1900 (1986); Definition of "red," available at 
http://www.dictionary.com (WordNet 1.6, Princeton University 1997) (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2003). Compare these meaningful illustrative definitions with 
the explanatory definition of red: "The hue of the long-wave end of the visible 
spectrum, evoked in the human observer by radiant energy with wavelengths of 
approximately 630 to 750 nanometers." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra. 
42. See infra Part III.B. 
43. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 41 (defining vernacular 
meaning of the term prophylactic to mean a device to prevent an undesired 
pregnancy), available at http://www.bartleby.com. 
44. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000), available at 
http://www.bartleby.com; XII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 644 (2d ed. 1989). 
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (7th ed. 1999) (giving the example of "a 
prophylactic rule"). It is interesting to note that the definition of prophylactic 
was not added to Black's until 1999. 
46. DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1364 (28th ed. 1994) (defining 
"prophylactic" as "an agent that tends to ward off disease"); MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY 579 (1993) (defining "prophylactic" as 
"guarding from or preventing the spread or occurrence of disease or infection"); 
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prophylactically to prevent disease prior to exposure, or 
vaccines may be given to prevent the contraction of 
disease.47 The U.S. Supreme Court has used the term 
"prophylactic" to describe administrative rules,48 
legislation,49 judicial remedies,50 and private conduct.51 The 
commonality of the use of the adjective prophylactic in each 
of these contexts is to describe additional measures imposed 
to restrict legal conduct in order to prevent future harm. 
The question, however, for this Article, is what precisely 
prophylactic means in the judicial remedial context.52 
Prophylactic relief, as discussed below, is injunctive 
 
MOSBY'S DICTIONARY 1284 (4th ed. 1994) (defining "prophylaxis" as a biologic, 
chemical, or mechanical agent that prevents the spread of disease). 
47. See MOSBY'S DICTIONARY 1284 (4th ed. 1994); THE MERCK MANUAL OF 
DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2095-97 (17th ed. 1999). 
48. E.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 103 (2002) 
(discussing administrative rules under FMLA as "prophylactic"); Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 307 (2001) (describing as "prophylactic" administrative 
regulations that provide measures to eliminate workplace discrimination); 
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672-73 (1997) (upholding 
"prophylactic" securities regulation designed to prevent fraudulent trading); 
FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 393 (1959) (upholding the Commission's 
prophylactic remedy for violation of the Fur Labeling Act prohibiting the 
defendant's misbranding on six different labels, even though the proven 
violations concerned only three types of labels). 
49. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 152; Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729 
(2000) (describing Colorado statute aimed at preventing harm during abortion 
protests). 
50. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 382 (1997); 
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 712 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
51. Prophylactic measures imposed by private individuals are the issue in 
the First Amendment prophylaxis cases. In these cases, a defendant-imposed 
ordinance or rule has categorically banned speech in order to avoid some 
perceived harm. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Ass'n, 538 
U.S. 600 (2003) (discussing trilogy of cases of Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley, 
in which defendants have prohibited solicitation and telemarketing to combat 
fraud); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (prohibiting 
attorney solicitation). Such prophylaxis that is self-imposed by the defendant is 
often struck down by the Court as an impermissible, overly broad restriction of 
First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S.781 
(1988); Sec'y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Schaumburg 
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). The mantra emerging from 
these cases is that "[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are 
suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely 
touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 
(1963). 
52. For a discussion of prophylactic legislation, see infra text accompanying 
notes 150-62 & 206-26; see also Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33; 
Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33. 
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relief that addresses defendants' conduct attendant to the 
direct harm. The prophylactic remedy is seen in a variety of 
substantive contexts, including constitutional rights,53 
sexual harassment,54 prison conditions,55 abortion rights,56 
and economic regulation.57 However, regardless of context,58 
there are two definitive attributes of the prophylactic 
remedy: it is 1) injunctive relief with a preventive goal, 2) 
that imposes specific measures reaching affiliated legal 
conduct that contributes to the primary harm. 
A. Prophylaxis as a Subset of Injunctive Relief 
Prophylactic relief is a category of injunctive relief. Like 
all injunctions, it is an order from the court to the 
defendant enjoining negative conduct or commanding 
affirmative conduct.59 The conduct addressed in a 
prophylactic injunction, unlike other equitable relief, 
directs legal conduct that is affiliated with, rather than the 
 
53. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (equal protection in vote 
recount); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (school segregation); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. Of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (school segregation); 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (right to counsel); Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right against self-incrimination and right to counsel); 
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1965) (voting rights). 
54. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sims v. 
Montgomery County, 766 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Neal v. Dir., D.C. 
Dep't of Corrs., No. 93-2420, 1995 WL 517244 (D.D.C. 1995); Women Prisoners 
v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994); Lynch v. City of Des 
Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1990). 
55. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (access to courts); Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (unconstitutional prison conditions); Bounds v. 
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (access to courts); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 
(parole board discrimination against disabled); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 
(5th Cir. 1982) (conditions); Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. 
Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (conditions, program equality, medical care). 
56. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. 
Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
57. E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (securities fraud); FTC 
v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385 (1959) (deceptive fur labeling practices); FTC v. 
Nat'l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957) (antitrust price-fixing conspiracies); United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (antitrust monopoly), 
vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
58. The substantive context of prophylactic relief might be described 
generally as public law litigation. See Chayes, supra note 9, at 1284 (describing 
public law litigation broadly to include cases of antitrust, fraud, corporate 
governance, desegregation, employment discrimination, prison reform, and 
environmental law). 
59. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 162 (2d ed. 1993). 
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direct cause of or result of, the harm.60 Prophylaxis 
encompasses this legal conduct in order to take additional 
precautions against future harm. Thus, in order to prevent 
continuing or recurring harm, the court will address 
affiliated conduct that contributes to the harm in order to 
avert future wrongs.61 For example, to prevent future 
sexual harassment caused by a hostile environment, the 
court might order the defendant company to enact anti-
harassment policies, train employees on the meaning and 
law of sexual harassment, or adopt investigative and 
complaint procedures. Or in an economic regulation case, 
the court might prevent future harms by appointing an 
oversight board to monitor the defendant corporation's 
ongoing business.62 The two key attributes of prophylactic 
relief, then, are its preventive goal and its enjoining of legal 
conduct. The prophylactic injunction, like all injunctions, is 
enforced by the contempt power that subjects the defendant 
to fines or imprisonment for failing to obey the court's 
order.63 In this way, the prophylactic measures convert 
permissible conduct into illegal conduct for that particular 
defendant.64 
The existing analytical framework of injunctive relief 
omits prophylaxis from its classification. The modern 
 
60. See, e.g., People Who Care v. Rockford Bd of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 533 
(7th Cir. 1997) ("The discretionary power of a district court to formulate an 
equitable remedy for an adjudicated violation of law is broad. Where necessary 
for the elimination of the violation, the decree can properly fence the defendant 
in by forbidding conduct not unlawful in itself."). 
61. SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at 246 ("A prophylactic injunction seeks to 
safeguard the plaintiff's rights by directing the defendant's behavior so as to 
minimize the chance that wrongs might recur in the future."); cf. Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (describing antitrust 
merger law as a "prophylactic measure, intended 'primarily to arrest 
apprehended consequences of intercorporate relationships before those 
relationships could work their evil'") (citations omitted). 
62. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 
2002) (approving settlement that created a bipartisan technical committee and 
internal compliance officer to monitor future business activities); see also 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, 2002 WL 31654530 (D.D.C. Nov. 
12, 2002); Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (appointing an "Internal 
Antitrust Compliance Committee" consisting of a board and a chief compliance 
officer to oversee defendant corporation's future compliance with the antitrust 
laws). 
63. DOBBS, supra note 59, at 130. 
64. See SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at 246 ("Violation of a prophylactic 
injunction is not necessarily a legal wrong in itself, except that the injunction 
makes it so."). 
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textbook description of the types of injunctive relief 
identifies three types: preventive, reparative, and 
structural. 65 A preventive injunction is a simple injunction 
that prevents future harm by ordering the defendant to 
stop the illegal conduct.66 A reparative injunction repairs 
past harm by correcting the existing effects and 
consequences of that harm.67 A structural injunction alters 
 
65. DOBBS, supra note 59, at 164; LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 233. Professor 
Owen Fiss first coined the analytical terms "reparative" and "structural" relief 
to describe the orders issued in public law litigation. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7 (1978). 
66. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 59, at 164 ("A preventive injunction 
attempts to prevent the loss of an entitlement in the future."); FISS, supra note 
65, at 7-8 (describing the preventive injunction as a decree "which seeks to 
prohibit some discrete act or series of acts from occurring in the future" and 
comparing it to an individuated "mini-criminal statute"); SHOBEN & TABB, supra 
note 1, at 246 ("The preventive injunction . . . has roots deep in the common law. 
Its purpose is to prevent the defendant from inflicting future injury on the 
plaintiff."). For example, a defendant found to have racially discriminated by 
segregating schools would be ordered to stop discriminating, or provide a 
unitary racial school system. E.g., United States v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 977 
F. Supp. 1202, 1211 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("'Defendants . . . are enjoined from 
discriminating against black students attending the public schools in Defendant 
district on the basis of race and are required to take further action, as described 
herein, to disestablish the dual system of schools based upon race.'") (citations 
omitted). In another example from the Microsoft antitrust case, the company 
found to have violated the law prohibiting monopolies was ordered in essence to 
"stop violating the antitrust laws by maintaining its operating system monopoly 
through its browser." Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 68; see also Microsoft, 
2002 WL 31654530, at *2 (prohibiting company from restricting manufacturer 
or end user ability to alter browser function). 
67. See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 164 ("The reparative injunction requires 
the defendant to restore the plaintiff to a preexisting entitlement."); FISS, supra 
note 65, at 7-8 (describing the reparative injunction as a decree "which compels 
the defendant to engage in a course of action that seeks to correct the effects of 
a past wrong" and analogizing it to an in-kind damage award); LAYCOCK, supra 
note 4, at 269 ("The distinction between preventive and reparative injunctions 
is between preventing the wrongful act . . . and preventing some or all of the 
harmful consequences of that act."); see also SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at 
246 (using the label "restorative" to define an injunction that "principally 
operates to correct the present by undoing the effects of a past wrong. The 
notion of 'restoring' means that it focuses not only prospectively, as does the 
traditional preventive injunction, but also retroactively."). In the school 
desegregation example, the defendant school might be ordered in reparative 
relief to redress the deficiencies in education by adopting remedial education 
programs to bolster student learning. In the Microsoft monopoly example, 
reparative relief might order the defendant to correct the consequences of its 
monopoly by requiring the licensing of previously denied software and providing 
the functional ability to allow users to disconnect the Microsoft browser and use 
that of the competitor. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 667-68; Microsoft, 
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the organizational structure, rather than behavioral 
aspects, of an illegal institution.68 Prophylactic relief, if 
identified at all, has been subsumed within either 
reparative69 or structural injunctions. 70 This categorization, 
 
2002 WL 31654530, at *3 (ordering the disclosure of concealed computer codes); 
see also Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967) (ordering a reparative 
injunction to remedy the racial discrimination during an election by setting 
aside the election and ordering a new special election); Vasquez v. Bannworths, 
Inc., 707 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1986) (ordering a reparative injunction requiring 
defendant to rehire employee wrongfully discharged because of her union 
affiliation). 
68. FISS, supra note 65, at 7 (describing the structural injunction, "which 
seeks to effectuate the reorganization of an ongoing social institution"); Justice, 
supra note 9, at 2 ("The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a 
state bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to 
restructure the organization to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the 
present institutional arrangements.") In the school desegregation example, the 
school organization itself is ordered to alter its dual racial structure and adopt a 
unitary racial system rather than simply stopping its discriminatory behavior. 
FISS, supra note 65, at 9; Justice, supra note 9, at 2-3. Structural relief in the 
Microsoft monopoly case would have restructured the company into two 
companies, one for the Windows operating system and one for the remaining 
software products. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 64. 
69. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 4; SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 1, at 246 
(categorizing together restorative and prophylactic injunctions). This theory 
conceptualizes prophylaxis as any broad injunctive relief that reaches wide to 
redress the harm. LAYCOCK, supra note 4 (explaining case of overbroad 
injunctive scope as prophylactic); SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 37, 131 
(defining prophylactic relief as any relief which gives the plaintiff more than its 
rightful position). For example, injunctions that reach broadly across 
geographic districts or company locations have been categorized as prophylactic. 
See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra, note 4, at 283 (exemplifying prophylactic relief by 
case of Mantek Division v. Share Corp., 780 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986), where an 
injunction was issued by the trial court prohibiting former employees from 
selling competitor's goods anywhere in their former sales territory); 
SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 179 (characterizing as prophylactic the injunction 
in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994), barring use of 
"Bayer" name in the United States and in all foreign publications likely to cause 
confusion to U.S. consumers). In addition, blanket prohibitions of conduct 
resulting from a breach have also been classified as prophylactic. See, e.g., 
LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 285 (classifying as prophylactic the injunction in 
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995), prohibiting former 
employee from ever working for rival because of likelihood that trade secrets 
would be revealed and classifying order in Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, 
Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992), prohibiting law firm from 
representing competitors of a former client from which it had received 
confidential information of value to competitors); SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 
131 (describing as prophylactic relief the injunction in Paramount Pictures v. 
Davis, 228 Cal. App.2d 827 (1964) prohibiting Bette Davis from working for any 
studio until she completed her role for Paramount as contracted); SCHOENBROD, 
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however, incorrectly depicts the prophylactic injunction and 
fails to recognize its distinct goal and measures that 
differentiate it from the other categories.71 An accurate 
 
supra note 4, at 164 (classifying as prophylactic the injunction in PepsiCo 
prohibiting former employee from ever working for a rival because of the 
likelihood that trade secrets would be revealed).  This remedial classification 
based on the categorical prohibition of conduct likely stems from the judicial use 
of the term in the First Amendment context to describe municipal and 
organizational rules that broadly prohibit all speech. See supra note 23 and 
accompanying text. However, these blanket prohibitions imposed by the 
defendants are prophylactic not because of the absolution of their ban on 
conduct, but rather due to the preventive goal of the defendant entity which 
initially enacted the ban to avoid future illegal conduct. These injunctions are 
simply reparative injunctions rectifying the consequences of the harm by relief 
that is broad in scope, not prophylactic in character. The analytical problem 
with characterizing prophylactic relief as any overbroad relief is that it feeds 
into the critic's argument that prophylactic relief is simply a blanket license to 
use equity to overreach. Moreover, the reparative characterization of 
prophylaxis is fundamentally flawed because the reparative relief focuses on 
the post-deprivation time period. Prophylactic relief, to the contrary, addresses 
conduct preceding a threatened harm in order to prevent that harm; it does not 
reach out to correct the consequences of that harm. 
70. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 59, at 643 (describing orders requiring 
notice of employee rights or instituting a grievance system as a type of 
structural injunction that is "simple in comparison" to usual structural 
injunctions); FISS, supra note 65, at 13; LAYCOCK, supra note 4; Chayes, supra 
note 9, at 1281; Landsberg, supra note 2, at 936 (recognizing that 
"[p]rophylactic commands became a central feature of what some came to call 
the structural injunction"). The construct of structural relief as an all-
encompassing public law remedy might explain how prophylactic relief has at 
times been subsumed within structural relief. Owen Fiss, in first describing the 
contours of his new remedial category of "structural relief," described structural 
relief as an injunction aimed at transforming the nature of the institution itself 
to conform to constitutional values. FISS, supra note 65, at 13. The 
distinguishing characteristics of the structural injunction were, according to 
Fiss, its goal of institutional reform, its alteration of institutional structure 
rather than behavior, its complexity, its impact upon societal groups, and its 
establishment of an ongoing relationship between the court and the defendant. 
Id. As an aside, Fiss noted that courts might sometimes accomplish structural 
change by the use of specific orders giving the defendants precise, practical 
steps to follow. Id. Similarly, Professor Dobbs in his classic remedies treatise 
acknowledged the existence of a simpler, more specific type of injunctive 
measure contained within some structural relief. DOBBS, supra note 59, at 643. 
71. If anything, prophylactic relief is a subset of preventive relief providing 
a more complex order to prevent future harm. See Landsberg, supra note 2, at 
926-27 n.6 (stating that prophylactic "measures have also been called 
'preventive remedial,' but that phrase seems too limited because it sounds like 
ordinary preventive relief, aimed directly at the core violation than at risk") 
(citations omitted); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial 
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). 
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classification and recognition of prophylactic relief is 
important to understand the available remedial options and 
to counter the accusations of prophylaxis' illegitimacy which 
are founded in large part upon a misconception of the 
parameters of this remedy. 
In my view, a more accurate classification of injunctive 
relief would identify the three core types of injunctions as 
(1) preventive, (2) reparative, and (3) prophylactic. 
Structural relief would be reserved as a label for a hybrid 
injunction combining any or all of the three core injunctions 
and focused on structural rather than behavioral change.72 
The three core types of injunctive relief are available in 
every case to address the legal wrong at each phase of the 
harm continuum. Preventive relief addresses the core harm 
by ordering the cessation of illegal activity. Reparative 
relief addresses the subsequent consequences of that harm 
by redressing the resulting effects of the illegal act. 
Prophylactic relief focuses on the pre-harm time period in 
order to direct conduct that has a tendency to contribute to 
or facilitate the primary harm (Diagram A). 
 
Diagram A 
Prophylactic 
Facilitators Æ   
                                              Preventive                                 
Reparative 
                                    CAUSE——-HARM————CONSEQUENCES 
       Facilitators Æ 
 
This triumvirate of equitable relief allows the courts to 
redress harms more comprehensively and holistically. The 
court is able to treat the whole legal problem of contributor, 
cause, and effect rather than ineffectively applying 
remedial band-aids to the direct wound. 
Diverging from the existing classification model, it is 
also possible to understand the different types of injunctive 
relief as alternative adjectives used to describe the 
equitable relief imposed by the court. It might be useful to 
think in terms of different labels for these remedies, 
perhaps substituting the descriptions of short, tall, wide, 
 
72. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
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and round (Diagram B). A preventive injunction is short 
relief because it is a simple, minimalist order that requires 
the defendant to stop the harm. A reparative injunction is 
tall relief because it stretches tall to reach the continuing 
consequences of the past harm. A prophylactic injunction is 
wide in that it sweeps out wide to bring in affiliated legal 
conduct in order to prevent future harm. Prophylactic is not 
a third category of height, but rather provides an 
alternative description of relief by honing in on the most 
important characteristic – the width or breath of the relief. 
Structural relief can be described as round because it 
extends all around to encompass the short, tall, and wide 
aspects of relief by using all means to alter the structure of 
the institution. 
 
Diagram B 
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Structural relief emerges as a hybrid rather than a 
separate category of injunctive relief. For structural relief 
commonly is ordered as both preventive and reparative 
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relief.73 The important characteristic of structural relief as 
compared with the other categories is its alteration of the 
very structure of an institution as opposed to the behavior 
of the institutional actors.74 Defined analytically, structural 
relief is a rarely occurring type of remedy.75 Structural 
relief should be distinguished from the theory of remedial 
process that accompanied its original conceptualization. 
Both Professors Chayes and Fiss initially advocated for the 
structural injunction as part of a remedial process for public 
law rights that differed from private law.76 They envisioned 
an ongoing remedial process directed by an activist judge 
that focused on the transformation of a social condition 
affecting a social group rather than correcting an incident of 
wrongdoing against individual plaintiffs.77 This theory of 
remedial activism drew substantial criticism over the years, 
leading to a suspicion of structural relief and public law 
remedies in general.78 However, time has shown that judges 
generally do not act in this activist fashion, but rather, 
impose public law remedies using the same adjudicatory 
process as in private law cases.79 Thus, the structural 
 
73. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (ordering structural 
change in single sex military institution to both prevent and correct 
discrimination); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 
2000) (ordering structural injunction of divestiture as preventive relief to stop 
the continuation of the monopoly), vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
DOBBS, supra note 59, at 164 (stating that structural injunctions "would be 
simple reparative or preventive injunctions if they merely ordered authorities to 
carry out or to cease some specific act" rather than restructuring an institution); 
FISS, supra note 65, at 13 (describing structural relief as complex series of 
preventive and reparative injunctions distinguished by its alteration of the 
structure of the defendant's institution). 
74. See Justice, supra note 9, at 7-9; Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in 
Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2001) (addressing the economic 
realities of a structural injunction ordering divestiture of Microsoft); Microsoft 
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (indicating that the court was considering injunctive 
relief that would mandate both conduct modification and structural 
reorganization). 
75.  FISS, supra note 65, at 8 (arguing that the structural injunction emerges 
from among the other types of injunctions as "a truly unique legal instrument"); 
Justice, supra note 9, at 17 ("[S]tructural reform surely is a transformation; it 
looks breathtakingly different."). 
76. See Chayes, supra note 9, at 1281; Justice, supra note 9, at 18-28. 
77. See Justice, supra note 9, at 18-28. 
78. DOBBS, supra note 59, at 645 (describing the skepticism with which 
structural injunctions are viewed); see, e.g., Yoo, supra note 7, at 1123; Paul J. 
Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978). 
79. See infra Part II.B; Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial 
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injunction construct should be extricated from its associated 
context of judicial activism, and recognized as one of the 
four possible types of injunctive relief in any given case.80 
Ultimately, the utility of the four labels characterizing 
injunctive relief lies in their ability to analytically describe 
the relief ordered by courts. The categories reinforce that 
the exercise of remedial equity is not the random use of 
each judge's individual views and biases, but rather, is a 
constrained authority to impose one of four types of 
permissible measures when injunctive relief is requested 
and necessary. Perhaps more importantly, the injunctive 
categories assist lawyers and courts in initially crafting 
equitable relief in a given case. The parties can think 
through each category of injunctive relief as they routinely 
do with damages (i.e., general, consequential, incidental, 
pecuniary, and non-pecuniary damages), to conceptualize 
what type of relief may be appropriate in their case. The 
categories thus circumscribe the arguments in equity, and 
provide the courts and lawyers with a common language in 
discussing equitable relief. Thus, the starting point for 
understanding prophylactic relief is recognizing it as a 
distinct subset of injunctive relief designed ultimately to 
prevent future harm.81 
B. The Specific Measures Directing Affiliated Legal Conduct 
The hallmark of prophylactic relief, distinguishing it 
from other injunctive remedies, is its specificity in directing 
legal conduct affiliated with, but not causing, the legal 
harm. Prophylaxis encompasses "affiliated conduct," that is, 
secondary conduct that is causally linked with the direct 
harm, but which itself does not violate the law.82 For 
 
Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. 
REV. 1623, 1627 (2003) (conducting a study of school desegregation remedies 
from 1992 to 2002 and concluding that judges do not behave in atypical, activist 
ways in imposing public law remedies, but rather follow a process common to 
most private litigation). 
80. See FISS, supra note 65, at 9-10 (noting that the antecedents to the 
desegregation structural injunction could be found in the railroad monopoly 
cases of the turn of the century and the modern antitrust divestiture cases). 
81. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 366-74 (disagreeing 
with the academic conceptualization of prophylaxis as a judicial "rule" and 
explaining the remedial character of prophylaxis). 
82. Cf. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672-73 (1997) ("A 
prophylactic measure, because its mission is to prevent, typically encompasses 
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example, in the sexual harassment context, the harassment 
of the employee by an individual is the primary cause of the 
harm that violates law. Yet, affiliated conduct, such as the 
company culture, the corporate policies, and the corporate 
response, may all contribute to that harassment even 
though the lack of a policy or training itself does not violate 
the law. These contributors of harm may be addressed by 
the court in a prophylactic order when necessary to redress 
a legal violation.83 Prophylactic relief is therefore 
distinguished from among the other injunctive remedies by 
its inclusion of specific safeguards or measures adding to 
relief prohibiting or correcting the primary legal harm. 
The ability of this remedy to use specificity and 
precision to hone in on affiliated conduct is what makes this 
remedy effective at redressing the whole of the legal 
problem.84 Other remedies are often inadequate to provide 
the necessary holistic solution to a complex legal problem.85 
The concept of holistic treatment derived from medicine 
refers to the treatment of the patient's diet, environment, 
and psychological being in addition to the medical 
treatment of the primary disease.86 The holistic theory is 
 
more than the core activity prohibited."). 
83. E.g., Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634, 679-81 
(D.D.C. 1994), overruled in part, 93 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (overturning 
appointment of special officer to monitor and investigate sexual harassment 
complaints). 
84. See Justice, supra note 9, at 47-49; Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 675; 
infra Part III.A. 
85. Chayes, supra note 9, at 1295 (stating that simple prohibitory orders 
such as "stop denying treatment to mental patient" are inadequate to provide 
meaningful relief in public law litigation). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
R. 2.1 & cmt. 2 (2002) (indicating that lawyers should address moral, economic, 
social and political considerations to provide meaningful advice to the client). 
86. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 41 (defining holistic 
medicine as "an approach to medical care that emphasizes the study of all 
aspects of a person's health, including physical, psychological, social, economic, 
and cultural factors"), available at http://www.bartleby.com. The American 
Holistic Health Association defines "holistic" health in the following way: 
 Holistic health is actually an approach to life. Rather than focusing on 
illness or specific parts of the body, this ancient approach to health 
considers the whole person and how he or she interacts with his or her 
environment. It emphasizes the connection of mind, body, and spirit. 
The goal is to achieve maximum well-being, where everything is 
functioning the very best that is possible. With Holistic Health people 
accept responsibility for their own level of well-being, and everyday 
choices are used to take charge of one's own health. 
 SUZAN WALTER, THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BODY-MIND DISCIPLINES 
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that to prevent or cure a powerful disease, healthcare 
practitioners must address all factors that contribute to the 
patient's health.87 Similarly, prophylactic relief allows the 
courts to address all of the factors contributing to the legal 
"disease" in order to prevent a powerful problem of public 
import. Indeed, the types of harms seen in cases of 
prophylaxis tend to be among the most severe in civil law. 
These cases involve egregious harms that threaten personal 
integrity, personal liberty,88 or rights otherwise prioritized 
in the law.89 Thus, prophylactic relief is necessary, and even 
integral, to effective judicial response to existing complex 
problems. 
The holistic solution provided by prophylactic relief 
may, like any injunction, be affirmative or prohibitive in 
nature.90 An affirmative prophylactic remedy would require 
affirmative steps to prevent harm, while a prohibitive 
prophylactic remedy would enjoin the negative facilitators 
 
(1999), available at http://www.ahha.org/rosen.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). 
See also www.holisticmed.com/whatis.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) ("Holistic 
medicine is a system of health care which fosters a cooperative relationship 
among all those involved, leading towards optimal attainment of the physical, 
mental emotional, social and spiritual aspects of health. It emphasizes the need 
to look at the whole person, including analysis of physical, nutritional, 
environmental, emotional, social, spiritual and lifestyle values."); Michael H. 
Cohen, A Fixed Star in Health Care Reform: The Emerging Paradigm of Holistic 
Healing, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 79, 88 (1995) ("Holistic healing refers to a paradigm of 
health care that 'recognize[s] the importance of considering the condition of the 
patient as well as the disease and advances the theory that the psyche and the 
soma, the mind and the body, are one.' In holistic healing, 'all parts of the 
system—body, mind, spirit, environment, society—are interrelated and interact 
to produce health or disease; illness reflects an imbalance between the 
individual and the wider world.'") (citations omitted). 
87. See generally WILLIAM COLLINGE, M.P.H., PH.D., THE AMERICAN HOLISTIC 
HEALTH ASSOCIATION COMPLETE GUIDE TO ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE (1996); JAMES 
S. GORDON, HOLISTIC MEDICINE (1988). 
88. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 49 (2002) ("For instance, in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966), we found that an environment of police 
custodial interrogation was coercive enough to require prophylactic warnings 
only after observing that such an environment exerts a 'heavy toll on individual 
liberty.' But we have not required Miranda warnings during noncustodial police 
questioning."). 
89. See PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 
1993); Levinson, supra note 71; SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 94 ("Courts 
generally place a higher value on constitutional, statutory, and common law 
property rights than they do on enforcement of commercial promises . . . ."). 
90. See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 163-64 (discussing mandatory and 
prohibitory injunctions); LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 264 (explaining that 
injunctions can both forbid conduct and require action). 
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that tend to contribute to harm. The types of negative 
facilitators addressed by the court through prophylactic 
measures are varied depending upon the factual causes of 
the harm in a given case.91 Perhaps the most-well-known 
example of a prophylactic remedy prohibiting a facilitator of 
legal harm is the prison case of Hutto v. Finney.92 In Hutto, 
the Supreme Court upheld an injunction limiting punitive 
isolation to a maximum of thirty days even though the 
practice itself was found not to violate the Eighth 
Amendment.93 The Court upheld the restriction on punitive 
isolation because it was one factor facilitating the 
unconstitutional conditions of overcrowding and rampant 
violence.94 
Other examples of prophylaxis banning negative 
facilitators can be seen in the abortion protest cases of 
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,95 and Schenck v. 
Pro-Choice Network.96 In Madsen and Schenck, a key 
facilitator of the legal harm was the proximity of the 
protestors and the clients and employees of the abortion 
clinic.97 The prophylactic relief addressed the negative 
facilitator of the proximity by imposing a buffer zone 
around the clinic that the protestors were prohibited from 
entering.98 In addition, the Schenck Court addressed the 
 
91. E.g., United States v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 977 F. Supp. 1202 (S.D. 
Fla. 1997) (ordering that future school construction and site selection be done in 
a manner that prevents the recurrence of the dual racial school structure). 
92. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). Justice Rehnquist's dissent pejoratively labeled the 
injunction as a "prophylactic rule." He disagreed with the majority's conclusion 
that the period of time in punitive isolation related to the condition found 
offensive to the Constitution, and thus simply differed from the majority as to 
whether the isolation was in fact a facilitator of the legal harm. See id. at 712. 
93. Id. Confinement in punitive isolation was for an indeterminate period of 
time during which an average of four and sometimes as many as eleven 
prisoners were crowded into windowless 8' x 10' cells containing no furniture 
other than a water source and a toilet where they were given fewer than 1000 
calories a day and fed "grue," a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes, 
oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking the mixture 
in a pan. Id. at 682-83. 
94. Id. at 684 (finding that punitive isolation is one of the interdependent 
conditions that can lead to overcrowded cells, vandalized cells, rampant 
violence, and inadequate diet). 
95. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
96. 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
97. 512 U.S. at 755; 519 U.S. at 359. 
98. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 380 (affirming an injunction prohibiting 
demonstrations within 15 feet of the entrance to the abortion clinic); Madsen, 
512 U.S. at 753 (affirming in part an injunction ordering protestors to stay off 
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proximity problem of protestors approaching individuals by 
requiring protestors to "cease and desist" and move away 
from an individual if she did not want to hear the message 
being conveyed.99 
This remedial principle is also found in the private 
context of unfair competition. The Court in Federal Trade 
Commission v. National Lead Co., prohibited the negative 
facilitator of "zone-delivered pricing," which was a system 
by which the defendant sellers set the same delivered price 
for all customers in a particular geographic zone.100 The 
Court prohibited competitors from using similar zone-
delivered pricing because that system resulted in an 
anticompetitive conspiracy in the given case and was found 
by the court to facilitate illegal price fixing in general 
among the defendant companies.101 Thus, courts use 
prophylactic relief to ban conduct that is likely to contribute 
to future harm of the type demonstrated in the case. 
Prophylactic relief is also imposed to require defendants 
to take affirmative measures that will protect against the 
occurrence of future harm.102 These prophylactic measures 
mandating affirmative facilitators of prevention are either 
case specific or process oriented. As with prophylaxis 
involving negative facilitators, relief addressing affirmative 
facilitators will conform its measures to the contributing 
realities demonstrated by the case.103 For example, in the 
 
clinic's property and to stay off public property within 36 feet of the clinic's 
property line). 
99. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 357, 383-84 (affirming injunction permitting two 
sidewalk counselors within the 15-foot zone but requiring them to cease and 
desist from talking to any person who asked them to leave); see also Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707-08 (2000) (upholding COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122, 
making it unlawful for any person to knowingly approach another person 
within eight feet for the purpose of protesting when that person is within a 
radius of 100 feet from any entrance door to a health care facility). 
100. 352 U.S. 419, 430 (1957) ("[D]ecrees often suppress a lawful device 
when it is used to carry out an unlawful purpose. In such instances the Court is 
obliged not only to suppress the unlawful practice but to take such reasonable 
action as is calculated to preclude the revival of the illegal practice."). 
101. Id. at 426 (limiting the use of zone-delivered pricing because the 
practice readily lent itself to price fixing and the history of its unlawful use was 
pervasive in the industry). 
102. E.g., Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634, 679 
(D.D.C. 1994). 
103. E.g., id. at 679-90 (requiring affirmative steps with respect to sexual 
harassment, obstetrical and gynecological care, educational programs, and fire 
and environmental safety as dictated by the evidence). 
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desegregation case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
County,104 the evidence and argument at trial demonstrated 
that racial segregation in the schools was caused by the 
primary conduct of the school's assignment policy, and 
facilitated by the realities of segregation in housing and 
economic segregation. The prophylactic measures adopted 
by the Swann Court of busing, gerrymandered attendance 
zones, and quotas were aimed at preventing future school 
segregation by addressing the contributing cause of the 
housing segregation. 
In addition, the cases of prophylactic relief addressing 
affirmative facilitators commonly impose process-oriented 
measures to protect against the threatened harm. 
Regardless of the substantive context of the case, 
prophylactic measures often require procedural safeguards 
such as institutional policies, procedures, training, notice, 
or monitoring. Prophylactic cases routinely require 
defendants to develop new policies, such as an anti-
harassment policy or a race-neutral assignment policy.105 
These policy remedies are designed to address the problem 
from the top-down by instituting internal mechanisms that 
establish organizational cultures designed to avoid harm 
and that allow the defendant to self-regulate against future 
harm independent of the court. Courts also impose 
procedures upon defendants through prophylactic relief to 
provide them with a series of tangible steps to follow to 
avoid a recurrence of harm.106 Examples of prophylactic 
procedures imposed by the courts include the complaint and 
grievance processes mandated in sexual harassment 
cases,107 the vote recount process mandated in Bush v. 
 
104. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
105. E.g., id. at 679, 680 ("Within 60 days, the Defendants shall write and 
follow a Department Order prohibiting sexual harassment involving District of 
Columbia Department of Corrections (DCDC) employees and women 
prisoners . . . . Under this policy the DCDC has the obligation to take 
appropriate steps to prevent and remedy sexual harassment committed by its 
own employees . . . . Prohibited conduct under the policy shall be defined 
as . . . ." ). 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 103-104; infra text accompanying 
notes 106-07; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969) (mandating 
process to avoid harsher sentence on resentencing after successful appeal); 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (adopting procedure governing 
withdrawal of counsel to protect defendant's right to counsel). 
107. E.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Perhaps 
the most important part of the preventive remedy will be a prompt and effective 
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Gore,108 and the parole procedures required to avoid future 
discrimination against parolees.109 Employees of the 
defendant organizations then may also be ordered by 
prophylactic relief to undergo training on the new policy110 
to ensure the proper implementation of the processes. 
The fourth common prophylactic measure of a 
procedural nature requires notice to the plaintiff or 
disclosure by the defendant. Prophylactic remedies 
mandating notice are designed to prevent future violations 
of rights by addressing the significant causal contributor of 
the plaintiff's own lack of knowledge.111 For example, in the 
sexual harassment cases, defendant companies notify 
employees of relevant policies or procedures by posting 
notices on bulletin boards or circulating letters.112 In the 
 
procedure for hearing, adjudicating, and remedying complaints of sexual 
harassment within the agency. The Director should promptly take all necessary 
steps to investigate and correct any harassment, including warnings and 
appropriate discipline directed at the offending party, and should generally 
develop other means of preventing harassment within the agency."). Process 
can be as simple as a hotline to report sexual harassment, or complex system 
for reporting, investigating, and sanctioning sexual harassment. See Women 
Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 680-81. 
108. 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam). 
109. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001). 
110. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 947 (ordering the director of the agency "to raise 
affirmatively the subject of sexual harassment with all his employees and 
inform all employees that sexual harassment violates Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Guidelines of the EEOC, the express orders of the Mayor 
of the District of Columbia, and the policy of the agency itself"); id. at 948 n.15 
(ordering the director of the agency "to develop other appropriate means of 
instructing employees of the Department of the harmful nature of sexual 
harassment" and to train employees on how to report sexual harassment and 
file grievances to enforce their rights); Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 681 
(ordering training conducted by an industry expert and containing certain 
mandatory information regarding the policies and processes for sexual 
harassment). In voting cases, courts have ordered the training of personnel 
involved in recounts to ensure the proper implementation of recount policy. See 
Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (noting additional concerns with Florida Supreme Court 
injunction which failed to specify who would recount ballots and forced county 
canvassing boards to pull together "ad hoc teams of judges" with "no previous 
training in handling and interpreting ballots"). 
111. E.g., Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 682 ("Defendants shall inform 
all women prisoners of the procedure to access health services while 
incarcerated."). 
112. E.g., Bundy, 641 F.2d 934, 948 n.15 (ordering defendants to "notify all 
employees and supervisors in the Department through individual letters and 
permanent posting in prominent locations throughout Department offices, that 
sexual harassment" violates the law and departmental policy); Women 
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case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,113 the Supreme Court 
required an investment adviser who violated the securities 
fraud law to disclose his own personal securities dealings to 
future clients when he advised them to make the same 
investments.114 This notice was important to providing the 
investment clients with the knowledge needed to avoid 
potential harm.115 And the infamous case of prophylaxis, 
Miranda, and its required warnings of a suspect's 
constitutional rights, show that prophylactic remedies are 
often imposed to ensure that the potential victim has 
sufficient knowledge of his rights under the law.116 For 
knowledge is power – and that power enables the plaintiff 
herself to prevent the harm.117 
The last, but perhaps most common, prophylactic 
measure imposing process-related affirmative measures 
upon the defendant requires monitoring of the defendant by 
the court or third party.118 In an early case of prophylaxis, 
the Supreme Court in Louisiana v. United States imposed 
reporting requirements to ensure that the defendant's 
future actions did not cause repeated race discrimination in 
voting.119 In prison condition litigation, courts routinely 
 
Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 679 ("The Defendants shall post and circulate the 
Department Order in accordance with departmental policy."); see also United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69 (D.D.C. 2000) (requiring 
defendant to provide notice to employees of the final judgment and injunction in 
the antitrust case accompanied by an explanation of that ruling to defendant's 
employees), vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
113. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
114. Id. at 181-82. 
115. Id. 
116. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
117. The phrase is attributed to Francis Bacon (1561-1621), a philosopher, 
writer, and scientist: "Knowledge is power. The more one knows, the more one 
will be able to control events." THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 52 
(E.D. Hirsch Jr. et al. eds. 3d ed. 2002); see also Proverbs 24:5 ("A wise man is 
strong; yea, a man of knowledge increaseth strength."). 
118. LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 285 ("Another common prophylactic 
provision is [the] monitoring of defendant's compliance with the injunction."); 
United States v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 977 F. Supp. 1202, 1227 (S.D. Fla. 
1997) (explaining an earlier order that required defendants "to file with the 
Court and provide to the parties annual reports containing a variety of 
information on the operation of the school system"). 
119. 380 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1965) (upholding prophylactic decree: "It also was 
certainly an appropriate exercise of the District Court's discretion to order 
reports to be made every month concerning the registration of voters in these 21 
parishes, in order that the court might be informed as to whether the old 
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order the defendants to submit reports to the plaintiffs or 
the court documenting compliance with the ordered 
relief.120 Courts may also appoint third parties to oversee 
the implementation of the ordered change or monitor future 
compliance with the law.121 And in the Microsoft antitrust 
case, in order to monitor the defendant corporation's future 
business practices, the district court initially created an 
internal compliance committee and authorized the 
inspection of the company's books and accounts upon 
request by plaintiff.122 
Thus, the key distinguishing characteristic of all 
prophylactic relief is its ability to address the contributing 
causes or facilitators of harm through specific measures. 
While this ability to reach related legal conduct is broad, it 
is not unlimited. For, as discussed below, the courts have 
restricted the use of the prophylactic remedy by permitting 
it to address only those facilitators that are causally linked 
to the proven harm. 
C. The Limited Reach of Prophylactic Relief 
Prophylaxis then is properly described as relief that 
"sweeps broadly to include legal conduct."123 This breadth is 
 
discriminatory practices really had been abandoned in good faith."). 
120. E.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 683 (1978) (describing district 
court's initial order providing the prison defendants with the first opportunity 
to remedy the proven harm, but requiring defendants to file reports on its 
progress); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1143, 1143 n.126 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(upholding district court requirement that defendant file reports on the number 
of inmates and space per inmate). 
121. E.g., Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 977 F. Supp. at 1227 (explaining an 
earlier order in a school desegregation case that established a bi-racial 
committee to be charged with "responsibility for discussing ways and means of 
achieving racial harmony and understanding among the students, teachers and 
parents and shall function as an advisory body to the school board"); cf., United 
States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding district court's 
grant of injunctive relief requiring defendant to seek advance approval from the 
Corps of Engineers prior to any dredging or filling operations where the 
defendant had drained swamps without the required wetlands permit and lied 
to the Corps about his operations). 
122. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69-70 (D.D.C. 
2000), vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
No. 98-1232, 2002 WL 31654530 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002) (ordering creation of 
technical committee to monitor future business actions, hiring of internal 
compliance officer by defendant corporation, and authorizing access and 
inspection by plaintiffs). 
123.  Strauss, supra note 22, at 959 (explaining that "in principle, Miranda 
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the core of the effectiveness of the prophylactic remedy, but 
it has also served as the lightning rod for attacks on 
prophylaxis.124 Critics argue that the remedy is overbroad 
in that it inappropriately "overprotects" plaintiff by giving 
her more than the operative right requires.125 The standard 
rule of injunctive relief is that the scope of the remedy must 
be confined by the scope of the harm in order to restrain the 
judge from exceeding his power to decide judicial cases.126 
The overbroad prophylactic remedy seemingly fails to 
conform to this tailoring requirement, and thus, it has been 
argued that prophylaxis constitutes judicial overreaching 
by judges who impose their own view of justice not dictated 
by the right itself.127  
 
is no different from any number of well-established rules of constitutional law 
that also, in a sense, 'sweep[] more broadly than the [Constitution] itself'") 
(quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985); Thomas, Remedial Rights, 
supra note 33, at 707, 727; cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) 
("Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations, can fall within 
the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits 
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional. . ."). 
124. See Yoo, supra note 7, at 1126-29; cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 775 
(2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (dissenting from affirmation of prophylactic 
legislative measure: "Overbreadth is a constitutional flaw, not a saving 
feature."). 
125.  Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 801-810 110 
Stat. 1321 1321-66 to –77 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 11 18, 28, and 
42 U.S.C.) (reacting to the perception of prophylactic injunctions as 
overprotecting prisoners' rights by limiting injunctive relief in prisoner cases 
arising out of conditions of confinement to the minimum necessary to correct 
the legal violation); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 209 (1989) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring) ("Like all prophylactic rules, the Miranda rule 'overprotects' the 
value at stake."); Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's 
Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 905 (2001) (arguing that Miranda's 
automatic rule "overprotects" a constitutional right: "Overprotection means 
protection beyond what the Constitution requires."); Klein, supra note 22, at 
1033 (describing prophylactic rules as those that overprotect constitutional 
rights); Landsberg, supra note 2, at 969; Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in 
Modern State Constitutionalism: New Judicial Federalism and the 
Acknowledged Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 303 (2003) 
(describing Justice Scalia's dissent in Dickerson as criticizing the "use of any 
form of prophylaxis in constitutionalism, expressing the view that doctrine 
should be congruent with constitutional values, and therefore the Court lacks 
the authority to overprotect"); Yoo, supra note 7, at 1126-29. But see Caminker, 
supra note 15, at 28 n.91 (arguing that the common characterization of 
prophylactics of "overprotecting" legal rights should end because it "wrongly 
assumes some 'natural' baseline of lesser protection"). 
126. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977). 
127. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446, 461, 465 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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These criticisms of the illegitimacy of prophylactic 
relief, however, are based on an inaccurate assumption that 
the use of prophylactic relief is unconstrained by any 
limiting principles.128 To the contrary, the breadth of 
prophylaxis is not haphazard or subject merely to the whim 
of the particular judge. Instead, prophylactic measures are 
constrained by two limiting principles routinely applied by 
the courts in crafting prophylactic relief. First, the 
prophylactic remedy must be narrowly targeted at 
redressing the proven harm, rather than aimed at some 
ancillary social concern.129 Second, the affiliated conduct 
included in the prophylactic relief must demonstrate a 
sufficient causal nexus to the established harm.130 These 
limitations of prophylactic relief emanate from the Article 
III requirement that judicial power be confined to "cases or 
controversies."131 Thus, prophylactic relief properly tailored 
to the two limiting principles constitutes a legitimate 
exercise of the courts' remedial power.132 
1. Targeting the Legal Harm. The initial assumption was 
that prophylaxis could not, and should not, be explained as 
conforming to the tailoring rule.133 Early supporters of 
 
128. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
("[W]e have permitted the federal courts to exercise virtually unlimited 
equitable powers to remedy this alleged constitutional violation."); Yoo, supra 
note 7, at 1128 (arguing that the expansion of judicial remedial authority in the 
prophylactic and structural injunction cases was accompanied by an 
unwillingness of the Court to impose any meaningful limitation upon the courts' 
exercise of equitable discretion); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 762 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (declaring that "[p]rophylaxis is the antithesis of narrowly 
tailoring"). 
129. See infra Part I.C.1; cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 204 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that 
"'remediation' that is the traditional business of Anglo-American courts is relief 
specifically tailored to the plaintiff's injury, and not any sort of relief that has 
some incidental benefit to the plaintiff"). 
130. See infra Part I.C.2. 
131. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Landsberg, supra note 2, at 956-58; cf. 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) ("When transported into the Art. III 
context, that principle, grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers, 
counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific 
legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a 
restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its 
legal duties."). 
132. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 374-80. 
133. See Chayes, supra note 9, at 1293-94 ("The form of relief does not flow 
ineluctably from the liability determination, but is fashioned ad hoc."); Justice, 
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prophylactic remedies tried to justify the presumed 
departure from tailoring. Professors Fiss and Chayes 
argued that untailored prophylactic remedies were needed 
to provide the courts with the necessary flexibility to 
achieve social justice in public law cases.134 To them, the 
beauty of the prophylactic remedy was its ability to work 
outside the traditional confines of the positive law to instill 
public values.135 
Professor Schoenbrod rejected this general attack on 
the tailoring rule, and illustrated the long acceptance of the 
rule as well as its continuing importance.136 He explained 
that the remedial tailoring rule is intended to avoid social 
activism by judges, minimize judicial intrusion on the 
defendant, and provide predictability in the discretionary 
arena of equitable remedies.137 Schoenbrod though, like 
Fiss and Chayes, approved of the use of prophylactic 
remedies. He asserted that prophylactic injunctions could in 
fact constitute properly tailored relief.138 He distinguished 
between the terms and the aim of an injunction.139 For 
Schoenbrod, as long as the aim of the injunction was 
tailored to the proven harm, the terms of the injunction 
could permissibly reach wider than the direct harm if 
necessary.140 That is, if the prophylactic remedy furthered 
the purpose of the right by aiming at returning the plaintiff 
to her rightful position (i.e. the position she would have 
been in but for the harm), then the terms could reach any 
affiliated legal conduct in order to ensure protection and 
enforcement of the injunction. However, where that 
proportional aim was lacking, prophylactic relief would be 
improper in scope. 
 
supra note 9, at 46-47. 
134. See Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger 
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982); Chayes, supra note 9; FISS, supra note 65; 
Justice, supra note 9, at 46-47. 
135. Justice, supra note 9, at 47 (arguing that the tailoring principle 
fundamentally misleads because it suggests a formalistic quality that is not 
actually present between right and remedy). 
136. SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 133; Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 671. 
137. Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 676, 691 ("Abandoning the tailoring 
doctrine, however, is not a satisfactory alternative because doing so simply 
permits judges to engage in completely unconstrained policy making."). 
138. Id. at 671. 
139. Id. at 678. 
140. Id. (arguing that a prophylactic measure that grants more than the 
plaintiff's rightful position is appropriate if it furthers the goals of the law). 
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Thus, the first rule of limitation for prophylactic relief 
as explained by Professor Schoenbrod is that it must aim to 
remedy an existing harm.141 The Court has followed 
Schoenbrod's principle requiring properly targeted relief by 
rejecting remedial orders that improperly target social 
concerns other than the threatened legal harm.142 
Sometimes stated in doctrinal terms, the rule becomes that 
a remedial decree must be designed to return the plaintiffs 
to their rightful position where they would have been but 
for the harm.143 The lack of this requisite remedial goal has 
been the most common failing of injunctive relief 
overturned by the Supreme Court as overbroad.144 In 
Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court struck down prophylactic 
measures designed to reverse white flight by creating 
attractive public schools in the city.145 The key failing of 
that remedial order was its aim at a social problem—white 
 
141. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) ("[F]ederal-court decrees 
exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does 
not violate the Constitution . . . ."); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); 
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 392 (Thomas, J., concurring); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 
70, 91, 134-36 (1995); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 
534 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that equitable remediation should be "guided by 
norms of proportionality. That is, the remedy must be tailored to the violation, 
rather than the violation's being a pretext for the remedy. Violations of law 
must be dealt with firmly, but not used to launch federal courts on ambitious 
schemes of social engineering") (citations omitted); Newman v. Alabama, 559 
F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1977) ("It does mean in the prison context that federal 
courts should keep their eyes on the main objective, the Eighth Amendment 
command for the eradication of cruel and unusual punishment. The remedy 
must be designed to accomplish that goal, not to exercise judicial power for the 
attainment of what we as individuals might like to see accomplished in the way 
of ideal prison conditions."). 
142.  Lewis, 518 U.S. at 392; Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 134-36; Freeman v. Pitts, 
503 U.S. 467 (1992); cf. Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 
947, 969-70 (1984) (invalidating state regulation of charitable solicitation 
because it was aimed not at fraud but at the percentage of funds collected in the 
hope that it would sweep fraud in during the process). 
143. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 
357 (1996); Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 88; Milliken, 433 U.S. at 280. 
144. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357-60; Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 134-36; Freeman, 
503 U.S. at 487 (invalidating remedy requiring annual readjustment of racial 
composition of schools to ensure "no majority of minority" from future housing 
migration changes where remedy addressed emerging social problem rather 
than redressing past violation of law or its consequences). 
145. 515 U.S. 70 (1995), rev'g 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (ordering 
prophylactic measures addressing magnet programs, capital improvements, 
local property tax, and a Model United nations meeting hall wired for 
language). 
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flight—that was not itself a constitutional wrong.146 In 
Lewis v. Casey, the district court aimed its prophylactic 
order at improving the management of the prison library 
rather than the legal wrong of the prisoners' denial of 
access to the courts.147 However, when courts fail to react to 
legal wrongs, they step outside the confines of their judicial 
powers, as Justice Thomas discussed in his concurrence in 
Lewis.148 Thus, as Professor Schoenbrod recognized, 
prophylactic relief, like all remedies, must be targeted to 
the established legal wrong to avoid the risk of illegitimate 
judicial action.149 
Similarly, Congress' power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enact prophylactic legislation 
has been restricted to legislation that aims at an identified 
legal wrong. The Supreme Court has interpreted Congress' 
power under the Section 5 enforcement clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to be a remedial power.150 
 
146. The Jenkins Court invalidated the remedial decree because it was 
designed for the purpose of achieving "desegregative attractiveness" to reverse 
white flight rather than curing unconstitutional segregation. 515 U.S. at 91-98; 
id. at 112 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the "authority contained in 
Article III of the Constitution limit[s] the judiciary's institutional capacity to 
prescribe palliatives for societal ills. The unfortunate fact of racial imbalance 
and bias in our society, however pervasive or invidious, does not admit of 
judicial intervention absent a constitutional violation"); id. at 136 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (holding that trial court "failed to target its equitable remedies in 
this case specifically to cure the harm suffered by the victims"); see also Parker, 
supra note 18, at 487-506 (discussing in depth the facts and remedial 
significance of Missouri v. Jenkins). 
147. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 392 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The District Court 
also 'failed to target its equitable remedies in this case specifically to cure the 
harm suffered by the victims' of unconstitutional conduct." (quoting Jenkins, 
515 U.S. at 136)); see also FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 13-20 (noting that 
judges in prison cases in the 1960s to 1980s uniformly sought to impose better 
prison management conforming to industry standards rather than remediation 
of the constitutional problem). In fairness, the district court's detour in Casey v. 
Lewis, 773 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Ariz. 1991), seems to have been its belief that the 
prophylactic remedy aimed at the prison law library ordered in Bounds v. 
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), itself created a new actionable right and therefore 
crafted its injunction to respond to the denial of the perceived Bounds right. See 
infra text accompanying notes 345-62. 
148. 518 U.S. at 385-93 (Thomas, J., concurring); accord Jenkins, 515 U.S. 
at 114-138 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
149. Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 671; SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 37, 
353. 
150. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. 
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 
722-39 (exploring the meaning of remedial prophylactic legislation under 
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Accordingly, the Court has used the analogue of judicial 
remedial power to define the parameters of the legislature's 
designated remedial power. 151 In a recent spate of cases, 
 
Section 5). The academic debate continues as to why the parameters of Section 
5 legislative power should be interpreted analogously to the judicial power. 
Most commentators continue to argue that the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence 
is incorrect and that the Section 5 power should be construed broadly in the 
same manner as other general legislative powers. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., 
NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 
148 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2002) (asking "why Congress should be confined to the 
remedial. The fourteenth amendment assigns Congress the role of enforcing its 
guarantees. The amendment assigns no role to the court"); Evan H. Caminker, 
"Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
1127, 1131 (2001) (arguing that Section 5 power should be interpreted according 
to rational relation test of regular Article I legislation); Samuel Estreicher & 
Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of 
Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 134 n.105 (finding the 
argument that the Section 5 proportionality test may be justified by reference to 
the law of remedies "ultimately unpersuasive, for it fails satisfactorily to 
explain why Congress's power should be adjudged by the same standards that 
govern the ability of lower courts to fashion remedies for constitutional or 
statutory violations").  But see Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 469-70 
(arguing that the test may be justified by reference to the law of remedies 
requiring any judicially crafted remedy must respond proportionally to the 
wrong it seeks to redress); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 722-24 
(endorsing interpretation of Section 5 using judicial remedial analogues); 
Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State Sovereign 
Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1551 (2003) (reviewing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: 
THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002)) (disagreeing with Judge 
Noonan and arguing for the plausibility of interpreting Section 5 as a 
prophylactic remedial power).  The short answer is that the drafters of Section 5 
rejected a general legislative power to do all that was "necessary and proper," 
and instead, adopted language describing a remedial power to "enforce" the 
Amendment by providing substitute remedies in the derogation of that 
responsibility by southern courts. See Thomas, supra note 33, at 707-09. In 
choosing to circumscribe legislative power, the drafters of Section 5 must have 
intended something different from the usual legislative authority. But see Ruth 
Colker, The Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 
B.C. L. REV. 783 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court made significant 
historical errors in interpreting Section 5 as a remedial rather than interpretive 
authority); James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, 
Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67 
(2002) (tracing history of privileges and immunities clause and Section 5 to 
suggest a source of broad interpretive power). 
151. See Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 486 ("[T]he law of 
remedies helps to provide a background understanding of what it means to 
'enforce' a right within the meaning of Section 5. The Supreme Court should not 
give Congress more latitude in determining whether it has exceeded its 
remedial power under Section 5 than the Court grants lower courts in 
determining whether they have exceeded their remedial power."); Thomas, 
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the Court has explained the doctrinal limitations of 
prophylactic legislation.152 Commentators have universally 
criticized the Court for its failure to establish criteria 
capable of distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate 
remedial legislation, accusing the Court of endorsing a 
standard for unaccountable judicial decisionmaking.153 
However, the criteria for prophylactic legislation are 
apparent on the face of the opinions, but perhaps lack 
meaning in the absence of an accurate understanding of 
judicial prophylaxis.154 For without restrictions on Section 5 
relief, the remedial power becomes a plenary power that 
contradicts the express bargain made in the constitutional 
amendment.155 
 
Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 714-39. 
152. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Bd. of Trs. 
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62; Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); 
Flores, 521 U.S. at 507. 
153. See Post & Siegel, supra note 34, at 1949 (arguing that the current 
Supreme Court "enforcement model" of Section 5 power does not offer a 
coherent framework for distinguishing between Section 5 laws that 
unconstitutionally "interpret" the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 5 laws 
that merely "enforce" it, and claiming that "[w]ithout guidance from the 
enforcement model itself, the decisions of the Rehnquist Court have been driven 
by implicit policy preferences"); NOONAN, supra note 150; Young, supra note 
150, at 1575 (describing Judge Noonan's reaction to the Section 5 
proportionality requirement: "Judge Noonan is shocked—shocked!—by the 
proportionality test: This formula was unprecedented. Proportionality in 
legislation! Who would measure the proportion?"); Ruth Colker & James J. 
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 85-86 (2001) (describing the 
"crystal ball" or "phantom legislative history" test of Section 5 proportionality 
established by the Court to support its judicial activism in striking down acts of 
Congress); cf. Caminker, supra note 150, at 1133 (arguing that the "Court's 
decision to subject all prophylactic Section 5 measures to significantly more 
rigorous means-ends scrutiny than measures that carry into execution 
Congress' various Article I and other powers cannot persuasively be defended"). 
154. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (applying the "now familiar 
principles" of prophylactic legislation to the Americans with Disabilities Act); 
see also Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 481 (explaining Section 5 
proportionality requirement by reference to the law of remedies); Landsberg, 
supra note 2, at 926 ("Once one understands the bases for prophylactic rules, it 
becomes possible to define the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate 
judicial prophylactic action."); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 720-
739 (explaining contours of prophylactic legislation by reference to cases 
imposing prophylactic injunctions). 
155. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-20 (indicating that "several limitations 
inherent in § 5's text and constitutional context have been recognized since the 
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The Court's first stated limitation of prophylactic 
legislation is that it, like prophylactic judicial relief, must 
be targeted to address an identified constitutional 
violation.156 Initially, Congress must make findings 
sufficient to identify an actual or perceived violation.157 For 
the remedial posture of Section 5 dictates that Congress 
react to a legal wrong, like a court, rather than address a 
general societal problem, which it may do under one of its 
alternative legislative powers.158 At its core, prophylactic 
legislation must be targeted at the legitimate end of 
 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted . . . . These limitations are necessary to 
prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully 
crafted balance of power between the States and the National government"); 
Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 487 ("If Congress were permitted to 
enact rules that it calls 'prophylactic' without any proportionality review, it 
could increase its power under Section 5 geometrically."); Remedial Rights, 
supra note 33, at 727. 
156. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-37; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88-91; The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12-13, 17 (1883); Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 
471, 481 (stating that Congress must first identify conduct transgressing 
Fourteenth Amendment); Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 714-720 
(discussing in depth the requirement that Section 5 legislation respond to an 
identified violation of a constitutional right). Others have preferred to phrase 
this remedial limitation in the traditional legislative powers terms of 
McCullough v. Maryland and its interpretation of the necessary and proper 
clause, stating that the legislation must be aimed at a legitimate end. E.g., J. 
Randy Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-End 
Relationships, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407 (2003); Caminker, supra note 150, at 
1127; Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 721. 
157. Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 667-69 
(2000) (describing the importance of fact finding to valid Section 5 legislation); 
Thomas,Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 716; Erin Rosen, Case Note, An 
Occasion for a More Thorough Analysis: The New Findings Requirement and 
Congressional Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After 
United States v. Morrison, 90 CAL. L. REV. 573 (2002). 
158. The benefit of enacting legislation under Section 5 is that the states 
have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for damages in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and thus Congress is able to enforce legislation by 
monetary remedies. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363; Ronald D. 
Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
After City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REV. 163, 169-70 (1998) (stating that 
Congress considers Section 5 to be the preferable mode of regulating the states 
because there is no interstate commerce requirement, eleventh amendment 
state immunity, rule of general applicability, or budgetary requirements of 
spending money); see also Morrison, 528 U.S. at 607 ("Every law enacted by 
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the 
Constitution. 'The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that 
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.'" 
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803))). 
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responding to unconstitutional conduct.159 
The failure of Congress to aim its prophylactic 
legislation at a legitimate end has been the downfall of 
most of the Section 5 legislation considered by the Supreme 
Court to date.160 However, in the Family Medical Leave Act 
("FMLA"), Congress finally got it right. The Supreme Court 
held in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs 
that Congress properly targeted its prophylactic legislation 
of the FMLA by aiming at gender discrimination by the 
states against women in the workplace.161 The FMLA 
targeted gender discrimination against working women by 
enacting prophylactic measures specifying twelve-week 
unpaid family leave for both sexes to address the adverse 
 
159.  Beck, supra note 156; Caminker, supra note 150; Thomas, Remedial 
Rights, supra note 33, at 714-21. 
160. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-72 (invalidating the Americans with 
Disabilities Act as applied to state employers on grounds that Congress failed to 
identify a predicate constitutional violation); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26 
(invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, which provided a civil remedy 
for victims of domestic violence because the attempted prophylactic legislation 
improperly aimed at the societal problem of domestic violence committed by 
private actors rather than gender discrimination perpetrated by the states); 
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (invalidating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
for targeting state employers' violations of the statute rather than 
unconstitutional conduct); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (invalidating the Patent and Plant 
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act permitting damages actions 
against state governments for patent infringement on grounds that the statute's 
basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent infringement and to 
place States on the same footing as private parties which was a legitimate aim 
under Congress' Article I powers but not under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (invalidating 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act for targeting legal laws of zoning, land-use, 
and fair housing as applied to religious practices). 
161. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735 ("In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional 
participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the 
administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of 
prophylactic § 5 legislation."). Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas dissented 
on this point, finding that the evidence failed to establish a constitutional 
violation by the states at which prophylactic legislation could be targeted. See 
id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 749 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The 
question is not whether the family leave provision is a congruent and 
proportional response to general gender-based stereotypes in employment 
which "ha[ve] historically produce discrimination in the hiring and promotion of 
women"; the question is whether it is a proper remedy to an alleged pattern of 
unconstitutional discrimination by States in the grant of family leave. The 
evidence of gender-based stereotypes is too remote to support the required 
showing.") (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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employment action against women.162 Thus, where 
prophylactic remedial legislation properly responds to an 
identified legal harm, it, like judicial prophylaxis, will be 
upheld. 
2. Sufficient Causal Nexus. In addition to a proper aim, 
prophylactic remedies are limited to addressing legal 
conduct that has a sufficient causal nexus to the harm. The 
causal nexus is established where the affiliated conduct 
bears a factual relationship to the harm and the 
relationship is of sufficiently close degree to justify the 
inclusion of the conduct in the prophylactic order.163 This 
type of causal nexus test is seen in other areas of the law 
where it is used to restrict judicial action to the parameters 
of the relevant law while providing the necessary flexibility 
to apply that law to the particular facts of each case.164 In 
 
162. Id. at 735-37; see Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) 
(2000). 
163. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "nexus" as "[a] 
connection or link, often a causal one"). 
164. For example, parallels exist in the law of antitrust, takings, state 
action, and sometimes standing. In antitrust law, a nexus test is used to 
determine the availability of judicial relief by evaluating whether plaintiff's 
business losses are of the type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent 
and flow from the unlawful conduct of the defendant. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (holding that injuries must be "of 
the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that 
which makes defendants' acts unlawful"); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 
479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986) (holding same for injunctive relief). In takings law, the 
court must determine whether there is an "essential nexus" between the 
legitimate state interest asserted for the taking and the permit condition 
extracted. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). In the state action cases, a nexus 
test requires a "sufficiently close relationship" between the state and the 
private actor in order for the private action to be attributable to the state. 
Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 2003); Kirtley v. 
Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003). To establish taxpayer standing for 
constitutional claims, plaintiffs must show their complaint falls within the zone 
of interest protected by the law by establishing a logical nexus between their 
status and the claim. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) ("Such inquiries 
into the nexus between the status asserted by the litigant and the claim he 
presents are essential to assure that he is a proper and appropriate party to 
invoke federal judicial power."); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984) ("The 
idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why our 
cases preclude the conclusion that respondents' alleged injury 'fairly can be 
traced to the challenged action' of the IRS. That conclusion would pave the way 
generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government 
violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out 
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the case of prophylactic relief, the nexus test aids in 
establishing the required remedial proportionality of 
mandating that the scope of injunctive relief conform to the 
scope of the harm in order to avoid judicial overreaching. 
The nexus test circumscribes the scope of the harm by 
including within the definition of "harm" that secondary 
conduct which has a sufficient causal connection to the 
primary illegality. Thus, the nexus test for prophylactic 
relief is used to provide the courts with the flexibility to 
reach legal conduct needed to prevent future harm while 
constraining those courts from going beyond their remedial 
mandate.165 
The first element of the causal nexus test for 
prophylactic measures is a required factual connection 
between the affiliated conduct and the harm. The law in 
other contexts imposes such a factual nexus requirement to 
assure that judicial action address the type of harm 
prohibited by law.166 For prophylactic relief, the requisite 
 
their legal obligations.") (citation omitted). But see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 203 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that dual nexus test of standing had "fallen into desuetude" and 
was a proxy for the requirement that plaintiff's injury be redressable by the 
court). 
165. Cf. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390 (requiring nexus to distinguish between "an 
appropriate exercise of the police power and an improper exercise of eminent 
domain" by determining "whether the requirement has some reasonable 
relationship or nexus to the use to which the property is being made or is 
merely being used as an excuse for taking property simply because at that 
particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some license or permit"). 
166. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (finding no factual nexus between the 
commission's asserted interest in promoting public visual access to the ocean 
and the permit condition requiring lateral public access along the plaintiff's 
beachfront lot); cf. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387 (discussing absence of factual nexus 
in Nollan and finding essential nexus in this case where governmental purposes 
of preventing flooding and traffic congestion were connected to the permit 
conditions requiring easements for flood plain and pedestrian/bicycle walkway); 
Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489 (holding that antitrust plaintiff failed to prove 
that injury though causally related was of the "type the antitrust laws were 
intended to prevent" where business losses resulted from increased rather than 
restrained competition); Flast, 392 U.S. at 102 (requiring the plaintiff establish 
a dual nexus for standing of showing "a logical link" between the plaintiff's 
taxpayer status and "the type of legislative enactment attacked" and a "nexus 
between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement 
alleged"); Gumm v. Apfel, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Kan. 1998) (requiring factual 
nexus for social security disability claim between impairment and the claimed 
pain for which plaintiff is claiming disability); Farb v. Fed. Kemper Life 
Assurance Co., 213 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D. Md. 2003) (identifying required "factual 
nexus" between amendment and original complaint for amendment of 
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factual relationship can be shown by demonstrating that 
the affiliated and illegal conduct share the same subject 
matter or the same issue.167 This threshold requirement, 
while seemingly loose, is not always met.168 In Lewis v. 
Casey,169 all nine Supreme Court Justices found that the 
prophylactic measures addressing noise, lighting, law book 
pocket parts, and library hours did not share the same type 
of legal issue as the proven harm of illiterate inmate access 
to the courts.170 While the measures dealt with the general 
topic of legal assistance to inmates, the harm proven in the 
case related only to illiterate and non-English-speaking 
prisoners.  Thus, all measures not factually connected with 
illiterate inmates were omitted from the decree.171 
Measures, however, providing individual lawyers or 
jailhouse assistants to aid the illiterate inmates were 
factually connected to the subject matter of the harm and 
properly included in injunctive relief.172 In another 
example, the court in the school desegregation case of 
People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education173 struck 
down prophylactic measures imposing racial quotas for 
teachers.174 The Seventh Circuit held that the harm 
 
pleadings). 
167. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996); cf. Riley v. Nat'l Fed. of the 
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 793 (1981) (invalidating law regulating 
charitable solicitation on the basis of the amount of funds collected by the 
organization due to the lack of nexus between the amount of funds retained by 
the fundraiser and the likelihood of fraud); Lau v Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 
(1974) (administrative prophylactic regulations promulgated for Title VI may go 
beyond the specific law as long as they are "reasonably related" to its 
antidiscrimination mandate). 
168. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 771 (1994) 
(invalidating prophylactic measure banning abortion protests within 36-foot 
buffer zone on private property where there was no evidence that protestors 
standing on private property obstructed access to the clinic or otherwise 
contributed to the interference with plaintiffs' rights). 
169. 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
170. Id. at 356-60; id. at 390-93 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 393-98 
(Souter, J., concurring); id. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
171. Id. at 356-60, 397-98 ("At the outset, therefore, we can eliminate from 
the proper scope of this injunction provisions directed at special services or 
special facilities required by non-English speakers, by prisoners in lockdown, 
and by the inmate population at large. If inadequacies of this character exist, 
they have not been found to have harmed any plaintiff in this lawsuit, and 
hence were not the proper object of this District Court's remediation."). 
172. Id. at 348, 359-61. 
173. 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997). 
174. Id. at 532, 534. 
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established at trial related only to racial discrimination 
against students, not teachers, and thus, the measures 
addressing the societal concern of faculty diversity were not 
sufficiently factually related to warrant inclusion in the 
remedial decree.175 
Second, the factual connection between the affiliated 
conduct and the harm must be sufficiently close to justify 
the inclusion of the conduct in the court's order.176 This type 
of causal nexus requiring a sufficiently close degree of 
relationship is analogous to nexus requirements imposed on 
judicial action in other areas of the law.177 The degree of 
relationship required for prophylactic relief is established 
by showing a foreseeable and proximate causal link between 
the measures and the harm. The foreseeability limitation 
requires some basis of knowledge to anticipate that the 
prophylactic measure has the potential to prevent harm.178 
For example, if expert testimony during the trial indicated 
that the lack of anti-harassment training fostered a 
sexually hostile environment, then there is a basis of 
 
175. Id. at 534. The Seventh Circuit also invalidated prophylactic measures 
addressing quotas for racial composition on the cheerleading squad finding that 
the provision was "indefensible" and could not possible be justified in the 
absence of evidence of discrimination against cheerleaders. Id. at 538. 
176. Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
("A court in both contexts [money damages and equitable relief] must base its 
relief on some clear 'indication of a significant causal connection between the 
conduct enjoined or mandated and the violation found directed toward the 
remedial goal intended'."). 
177. See infra text accompanying notes 193-94 (discussing causal nexus 
required for consequential damages and reparative injunctions); see, e.g., Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (imposing "rough proportionality" 
test as second prong of nexus test requiring "some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent 
to the impact of the proposed development"); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 759 (1984) (denying standing in part because of the lack of causal nexus 
between the injury alleged of school desegregation and the defendants' conduct 
of failing to deny tax-exempt status to private schools discriminating on basis of 
race); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) 
(holding that antitrust plaintiffs "must prove more than injury causally linked 
to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, 
which is to say injury . . . that flows from that which makes defendants' acts 
unlawful"); PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, 
TEXT, CASES 85 (5th ed. 1997) (describing nexus requirement of antitrust injury 
law as intended to evaluate whether the loss is connected closely enough with 
the remedial purpose of the antitrust laws). 
178. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "foreseeability" as 
"[t]he quality of being reasonably anticipatable."). 
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knowledge to anticipate that a measure requiring training 
might work to prevent harm.179 
The proximate cause limitation of prophylaxis looks for 
an indirect cause and effect relationship between the 
affiliated conduct and the harm.180 Proximate cause in 
general is a concept that limits the wrongdoer's liability 
rather than imposing responsibility for every possible 
connected harm or consequence.181 In the prophylactic 
remedy context, the proximate cause requirement limits the 
reach of judicial equity by restricting measures to those 
actions that might potentially protect against harm. The 
proximate cause limitation works prospectively to evaluate 
whether there is a potential causal link between the 
affiliated conduct and the harm. For example, in Missouri v. 
Jenkins,182 the Supreme Court struck down a prophylactic 
measure increasing teacher salaries to make the public 
schools more attractive to white students who had fled the 
 
179. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Neal v. D.C. 
Dep't of Corr., No. CIV.A93-2420, 1995 WL 517244, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1995); 
Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634, 666 (D.D.C. 1994); 
see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971) 
(tailoring prophylactic measures of gerrymandering districts, busing, and ratios 
to address location of schools that evidence showed in the past had been used as 
a potent weapon for creating or maintaining a state-segregated school system). 
180. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "proximate 
cause" as "a cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability"). 
181. See Graybill v. City of New York, 247 F. Supp. 2d 345, 351-52 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (using proximate cause notion to limit reach of Congress' 911 legislation 
for injuries resulting from or related to the terrorist attacks: "[P]roximate 
causation provides a useful framework for limiting the scope of that 
provision . . . .  [T]he tort concept of proximate causation, . . . guides judges and 
juries in deciding how far a tortfeasor's liability stretches. Proximate causation 
limits a tortfeasor's liability to the expected, natural or foreseeable 
consequences of his or her wrongful conduct."); see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, 264 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) 
("'Proximate cause'–in itself an unfortunate term–is merely the limitation 
which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the 
consequences of the actor's conduct. In a philosophical sense, the consequences 
of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn 
of human events, and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon 
such a basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts and would 'set 
society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation.' As a practical matter, 
legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely 
connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in 
imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences 
of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.") (quoting 
North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894)). 
182. 515 U.S. 70, 94, 100 (1995). 
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schools in order to ultimately desegregate the schools.183 
The Court held that the segregation had not caused the 
white flight and that the salary measures were simply too 
far removed from the harm to be an acceptable remedial 
means.184 Similarly in Rizzo v. Goode,185 the Supreme Court 
invalidated injunctive relief imposed after instances of 
officer violence were proven at trial.186 The Court struck 
down prophylactic measures ordering a civilian complaint 
procedure, new institutional policies, and departmental 
training where those measures addressed departmental 
conduct that was not shown to have contributed to the 
individual violations.187 In Cardenas v. Massey,188 the Third 
Circuit overturned prophylactic relief mandating the 
adoption of an anti-discrimination policy regarding race, 
because it would not have prevented future harm to the 
plaintiff who was no longer employed by the defendant.189 
The nexus required for prophylactic measures is not a 
close or strict requirement.190 For if the attendant conduct 
 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 94-95, 100. The Court in fact suggested that the remedy of 
desegregation actually caused the white flight rather than the harm of racial 
segregation. Id. at 95 (citing the record in the liability phase of trial, and citing 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Ed., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1995), which 
recognized that implementation of a desegregation remedy may result in white 
flight). 
185. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
186. Id. 
187. Id. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1977) (invalidating 
injunctive relief imposing prophylactic measures of busing on Detroit suburban 
school districts in order to cure white flight, because the suburbs were not 
involved in the educational segregation and therefore were not a proper target 
of the remedy). 
188. 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001). 
189. Id. The case was not brought as a class action, and thus the policy 
relief could not be justified as a remedy to protect employees similar to the 
plaintiff. This lack of causal nexus can also explain the Court's decision in 
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976). The Court 
invalidated a reparative injunction requiring annual readjustment of racial 
composition of schools to address housing migration finding that the migration 
was not a resulting consequence of the segregation. In addition, a causal nexus 
sufficient for prophylactic relief was missing because housing was not 
determined to be an original contributing factor to the school segregation and 
thus would not be affiliated conduct that could be restricted to prevent a 
reoccurrence of the same harm. See id. 
190. Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (rejecting strict 
test of exacting proportionality for nexus in takings law finding the constitution 
does not require such exacting scrutiny given the nature of the interests 
involved). 
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itself were so closely intertwined with the harm, it would 
likely constitute primary conduct directly causing the harm 
that would be subject to regular, rather than prophylactic, 
injunctive relief.191 The nexus for prophylactic conduct must 
be something less than that connection which makes the 
conduct itself illegal in order to have a meaningful 
distinction apart from other liability and remedies. Thus, it 
is sufficient to satisfy the nexus test if it is shown that the 
affiliated conduct sought to be included in the prophylactic 
order has a tendency or potential to facilitate the harm or 
its prevention.192 
Such principles of limitation based on a sufficient 
causal link also apply to remedies designed to redress 
conduct and losses from the primary harm. In the corrective 
remedial contexts of consequential damages and reparative 
injunctions, courts have historically used principles of 
foreseeability, proximate causation, and remoteness to limit 
the reach of judicial relief.193  Consequential damages are 
awarded to address the secondary losses occurring as a 
consequence of the demonstrated harm.194 Historically, 
there was some skepticism about awarding such damages 
out of the concern over fabrication or windfall to the 
plaintiff. 195 Some limitations on consequential damages 
 
191. See, e.g., Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (requiring a substantially close nexus between private actor and 
state actor in order to treat a private entity as the government for purposes of 
the state action doctrine in order to impose liability upon a private entity). 
192. Cf. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (adopting an intermediate test for degree of 
relationship required under the nexus test of takings law, requiring a showing 
of a reasonable relationship between condition and purpose which is more than 
generalized statements but less than specific, exacting proportionality); 
Brunswick v. Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977) (describing 
prophylactic provisions of the antitrust law as those which proscribe conduct 
that has a "tendency" or "potential" to cause certain harms). 
193. See Parker, supra note 18, at 521 ("In short, the right-remedy test 
depends on a knowable and ascertainable proximate cause connection between 
the violation and its effects, but proximate cause is rarely a useful concept in 
public law litigation."). 
194. See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 304; see also LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 61 
("Consequential damages should refer to everything that happens to plaintiff as 
a result of this initial loss."); but see Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 176 (2d 
Cir. 2000) ("'Special' or 'consequential' damages, on the other hand, seek to 
compensate a plaintiff for additional losses (other than the value of the 
promised performance) that are incurred as a result of the defendant's 
breach."). 
195. See generally Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 ENG. REP. 145 (1854) (limiting 
recovery of consequential damages for breach of contract because lost profits of 
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remain as a result of this concern, operating to deny such 
damages if they are unforeseeable, not proximately caused 
by the legal harm, avoidable by the plaintiff, too 
speculative, or too remote.196 In general, though, the law 
has evolved to widespread acceptance of consequential 
damages that are foreseeable by the defendant197 and 
proximately caused by the harm.198 
 
mill were not foreseeable). 
196. See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 318-21 (discussing rules inhibiting 
recovery of consequential damages, including certainty, proximate cause, 
foreseeability, and avoidable consequences); LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 63 
(identifying limits on consequential damages of causation, foreseeability, and 
remoteness); see also Roy Ryden Anderson, Incidental and Consequential 
Damages, 7 J. L. & COMMERCE 327, 330 (1987) (stating that the requirements for 
recovering consequential damages under the UCC "include proving that the 
injury was foreseeable, that the loss was reasonably certain in amount and that 
the loss could not have been reasonably avoided by the aggrieved party."); see 
generally Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982)  
(explaining the economic basis for the limitations on consequential damages). 
197. Cf. Centerline Inv. Co. v. Tri-Cor Indus., 80 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2002) ("We agree with Centerline that including a provision for 
'consequential' and 'any and all' damages in a lease broadens the scope of 
damages beyond those that are the 'natural and direct consequence' of the 
breach, but even consequential damages are limited. If consequential damage 
clauses were interpreted to allow recovery for 'any and all' damages, however 
remote, they would include damages entirely unimagined and unforeseeable by 
the parties and 'stretch infinitely in time.' The law has therefore limited 
consequential damages to those that are 'within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of contracting, or 'foreseeable' to them.'") (quoting DOBBS, 
LAW OF REMEDIES 228, 770 (2d ed. Hornbook Series, 1993)). 
198. See U.C.C. § 2-715 (authorizing buyer's damages for losses proximately 
caused); Caspe v. Aaacon Auto Transp., Inc., 658 F.2d 613, 617 (8th Cir. 1981) 
("The general rule does not require the plaintiff to show that the actual harm 
suffered was the most foreseeable of possible harms. He need only demonstrate 
that his harm was not so remote as to make it unforeseeable to a reasonable 
man at the time of contracting." (quoting Hector Martinez & Co. v. S. Pac. 
Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106, 110 (C.A. Tex. 1979)). However, the nomenclature of 
"consequential" damages still seems to connote the historical disfavor. See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (requiring foreseeability to recover 
consequential damages); James M. Fischer, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 21 
(1999) (distinguishing consequential damages that plaintiff must establish the 
causal relationship between the loss and the wrong from general damages that 
are presumed to follow inevitably from the wrong); LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 63 
("[M]y own sense is that little of the traditional hostility to special or 
consequential damages remains. This is especially true in tort, but 
consequential damages are now much more likely to be awarded in contract as 
well."); Paul S. Turner, Consequential Damages: Hadley v. Baxendale Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 655 (2001) (identifying the common 
practitioner definition of consequential damages as unforeseeable damages that 
are not recoverable). Thus, like prophylactic relief, remedies addressing 
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Similarly, reparative injunctive remedies, as discussed 
above, commonly address the consequences of past harm in 
order to prevent the continuation of that harm into the 
future.199 The Court has used the notion of proximate cause 
to define the boundaries of proper reparative relief.200 For 
example, in Milliken v. Bradley,201 the Court upheld an 
injunction ordering remedial education for students from 
segregated schools, finding that their low academic 
performance was a consequence of the segregation.202 At 
times, the Court has found this causation link to be easily 
satisfied through the use of presumptions, 203 while at other 
times it has required a more tangible basis for assessing the 
causal link. However, where the problem existing after a 
legal violation is shown not to be a result of the initial 
harm, such as where it is attributable to an intervening act, 
that problem is not a proper component of reparative relief. 
For example, in Freeman v. Pitts,204 the Court terminated 
an injunction addressing post-harm residential segregation 
caused by intervening private housing migration rather 
than by the original de jure school segregation.205 The 
 
secondary rather than direct harms still retain a pejorative label despite their 
wide acceptance in judicial practice. 
199. See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 225; LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 263. 
200. See LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 292; see, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 
467, 496 (1992) ("The vestiges of segregation that are the concern of the law in a 
school case may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless they must be so real 
that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied."); Milliken 
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (holding that remedy reaching non-party 
suburbs might be justified if the suburban school districts' acts caused racial 
segregation in the city); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-82 (1977) 
(Milliken II) (imposing remedy to address consequences caused by initial 
constitutional violation); see also Parker, supra note 18 (criticizing the Court's 
reliance on the proximate causation notion in constructing injunctive relief). 
201. 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
202. Id. at 291; see also LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 292 (discussing Milliken 
and its principle of injunctions addressing consequential harms). 
203. Compare Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) 
(requiring findings demonstrating that school segregation caused the effect or 
impact of citywide racial segregation in order to uphold system wide busing 
remedy), with Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton II) 
(using presumptions to conclude that residential segregation was a result of 
school segregation in few programs). 
204. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
205. See id. at 494 ("If the unlawful de jure policy of a school system has 
been the cause of the racial imbalance in student attendance, that condition 
must be remedied. The school district bears the burden of showing that any 
current imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation. 
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reparative injunction cases thus illustrate the core principle 
that equitable remedies must be flexible to provide 
complete relief to the plaintiff, but that they, like 
consequential damages, cannot be limitless. 
This same limitation of prophylaxis to reaching only 
causally linked conduct is also seen in the analogous area of 
prophylactic legislation. The Supreme Court has limited 
prophylactic legislation to regulating legal conduct that has 
a sufficient causal nexus to the identified harm.206 The 
Court's label for this nexus test in the prophylactic 
legislation context is "congruence and proportionality" and 
it mirrors in substance the test for properly tailored judicial 
prophylactic remedies.207 Prophylactic legislation must be 
congruent, that is, it must have a corresponding or 
overlapping factual nexus with the identified harm.208 And 
prophylactic legislation must be proportional in scope to the 
identified harm by reaching affiliated conduct only where 
that conduct has a sufficiently close causal link with the 
harm.209 In other words, Congress must use appropriate 
remedial means to achieve its ends rather than simply 
using any and all means to achieve its legitimate goal.210 
 
The findings of the District Court that the population changes which occurred 
in DeKalb County were not caused by the policies of the school district, but 
rather by independent factors, are consistent with the mobility that is a distinct 
characteristic of our society."); accord Pasadena v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 
(1976). 
206. See Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 727. 
207. E.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); City of Boerne v. 
P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 
(2000). Commentators have been confused by the apparent redundancy of the 
Court's "congruent and proportional" test and have attempted to provide more 
meaningful definitions for these terms by reference to legislative rather than 
remedial concepts. See Beck, supra note 156, at 429-30 ("Of course, in fairness 
to the Court, it may not have focused much on any precise conceptual 
distinction between these two components, instead wielding the phrase loosely 
to capture a set of interrelated and perhaps somewhat amorphous ideas about 
means-ends relationships. As a result, perhaps one should not push too hard to 
divine the precise and separable content of 'congruence' and 'proportionality' as 
used by the Court."); Caminker, supra note 150, at 1153. 
208. Professor Beck describes the congruence test as requiring that the 
legislation actually be a means by which the end can be achieved. Beck, supra 
note 156, at 434. 
209. Professors Caminker and Beck describe the proportionality 
requirement as requiring that the means be the appropriate size, shape, and 
necessary response to the identified end. See Beck, supra note 156, at 434; 
Caminker, supra note 150. 
210. See Morrison, 528 U.S. at 625-26 ("[P]rophylactic legislation under § 5 
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For without this limitation upon the reach of the legislative 
remedy, Congress creates rather than remedies rights 
which are outside the scope of the Section 5 power.211 
The threshold factual nexus between the prophylactic 
measures and the legal violation was missing from the 
prophylactic legislation at issue in Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett.212 The Supreme Court in 
Garrett invalidated the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) as applied to state employers.213 The factual nexus 
was missing because the ADA provisions imposing 
workplace rules for state employers of disabled employees 
did not relate to the legislative findings of workplace 
discrimination by non-state actors and discrimination by 
the state in the non-employment settings of public services 
and public accommodations.214 As in Lewis v. Casey,215 the 
prophylactic measures related to the subject matter only at 
the most general subject level – that is disability 
discrimination – and did not connect on the specific subject 
matter level by relating to the same actor of the state in the 
same context of employment.216 Similarly, in United States 
 
must have a 'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented 
or remedied and the means adopted to that end.'") (quoting Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 
(1999)). Contra Caminker, supra note 150 (arguing that legitimate ends should 
justify the use of all rationally related means); Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 672 
(properly targeted prophylactic remedy justifies court's use of any and all 
remedial means to accomplish that purpose). 
211. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) ("There must be a 
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may 
become substantive in operation and effect."); see also Beck, supra note 156, at 
411 ("If Congress regulates conduct far beyond the scope of any potential 
Fourteenth Amendment violations, a court may justifiably find the statute 
pretextual in that it aims at some end or object other than enforcement of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.") 
212. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
213. Id. at 374. 
214. Id. at 369-70, 371 n.7 (noting that while the congressional record 
contained many instances of general and historical discrimination against the 
disabled, few addressed the discriminatory activities of the state). 
215. 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
216. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 371 n.7 (2001); Lewis v. Casey, 
518 U.S. 343, 356-57 (1996) (holding that causal nexus between remedy and 
harm not met where both addressed general subject of prison legal assistance 
rather than specific issue of illiterate prisoner access to the courts). Cf. Nollan 
v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that nexus required 
for valid regulatory taking not met where general interest of enhancing the 
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v. Morrison,217 the attempted prophylactic measures 
providing federal remedies for private domestic violence, 
related generally to the identified subject matter of gender 
discrimination, but failed to correspond to the subject 
matter of the Fourteenth Amendment which addresses 
discrimination by state rather than private actors.218 The 
Court held that the measures regulating the conduct of 
private perpetrators were not congruous with the 
discriminatory harm caused by state actors.219 
In contrast, the required causal nexus was sufficiently 
established by Congress in enacting the Voting Rights Act, 
which outlawed literacy tests.220 In Katzenbach v. Moran, 
the Supreme Court upheld the prophylactic legislation of 
the voting act because it addressed the legal conduct of 
literacy tests that were factually related to the states' racial 
discrimination denying minorities the right to vote.221 
While the Supreme Court had held literacy tests 
themselves to be permissible conduct,222 Congress found 
that the state tests contributed to racial discrimination in 
voting and government services.223 The Katzenbach Court 
upheld the prophylactic legislation proscribing the legal 
conduct of the tests because they were sufficiently 
connected with the discriminatory harm; legislative 
findings showed that the tests causally contributed to the 
denial of the right to vote and thus it was foreseeable that 
continued use of the test would facilitate more harm.224 
 
public's ability to traverse to and along the shorefront was disconnected from 
the permit condition requiring lateral public access along plaintiff's beachfront). 
217. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
218. Id. at 621, 625-26; Beck, supra note 156, at 435; Thomas, Remedial 
Rights, supra note 33, at 729-30. 
219. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26. 
220. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 (contrasting invalid prophylactic 
legislation with the appropriate prophylactic legislation of the voting rights 
cases); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (explaining that the Court upheld the 
prophylactic legislation in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), because 
it properly targeted the type of harm prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
221. 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding prophylactic measures of prohibiting literacy test 
pursuant to remedial power of the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth 
Amendment). 
222. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 
(1959). 
223. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 653. 
224. Id. 
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Thus, the Court's prophylactic legislation jurisprudence 
reinforces the limiting principles of prophylactic remedies. 
Legislation can be prophylactic, in addition to being 
reparative or preventive, which allows Congress to go 
beyond the illegality itself to regulate permissible conduct 
in order to avoid future harm.225 However, limitations upon 
the content and reach of prophylactic legislation are 
necessary to prevent remedial power from converting into a 
general legislative power.226 As previously discussed, these 
same concerns of extrinsic assertions of power dominate the 
analysis of judicial prophylactic remedies. In both cases, the 
doctrinal limitations of the reach of prophylaxis are 
designed to confine the actor to the limited scope of its 
constitutionally-designated power, while at the same time 
facilitating the flexibility necessary to remedy modern and 
more complex wrongs and legal problems.227 
II. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE CHOICE OF PROPHYLACTIC 
RELIEF 
Broad equitable remedies like prophylaxis often trigger 
concerns that judges, in imposing such relief, are 
overstepping their authority by injecting their own personal 
views of right and wrong into the case.228 The reality of the 
process by which prophylactic remedies are chosen for a 
particular case, however, defies this portrayal of arbitrary 
 
225. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. 
226. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
227. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000) ("Difficult and 
intractable problems often require powerful remedies, and we have never held 
that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting reasonably prophylactic 
legislation."); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, at 31 
(1971) (upholding prophylactic relief and suggesting that the Court "sought to 
suggest the nature of limitations without frustrating the appropriate scope of 
equity"); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 
(1978). 
228. See Mishkin, supra note 78, at 960 ("The judge's attention is focused on 
what he sees as an evil. He is at the same time offered a proposal for action 
which promises to cure that evil. He is in a position to command the 
implementation of that proposal (or some other to the same end), and he feels 
that he ought to use his power to the end of remedying the perceived evil. . . . 
[R]ecognizing the validity and strength of these feelings, and of the 
commendable personal desire to act against a perceived evil, is not the same as 
accepting them as a legitimate basis for a federal court to exercise its power. 
Appointment as a federal judge does not, to use the classic phrase, confer "a 
roving commission to do good."). 
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remedial decisionmaking. Judges choose prophylactic 
remedies not as a default, but as a less restrictive 
alternative to other relief.229 Defendants are given the first 
opportunity to craft their own solution to the legal problem 
or the courts will initially impose the less restrictive 
alternative of a negative, preventive injunction.230 It is only 
where those other remedies of private resolution and 
limited intrusion fail that courts then turn to the more 
precise and powerful remedial weapon of prophylaxis. 
Judges carefully craft the prophylactic measures based on 
the evidence and argumentation presented during the 
case.231 As in any decisionmaking process, judges may rely 
on the parties, experts, evidence or legal precedent to 
formulate a decision as to the appropriate remedy.232 
Courts that impose prophylactic remedies without following 
this cautious and restrained approach may have their 
orders invalidated as an abuse of equitable power.233 
A. Prophylaxis as the Least Restrictive Alternative 
As explained thus far, the prophylactic remedy has 
tremendous power to prevent harm by addressing affiliated 
conduct with specific, enforceable measures.234 The remedy, 
however, poses the inherent risk of unnecessarily 
regulating defendants' behavior. Unlike all other remedies, 
prophylaxis directs defendants' legal conduct that 
contributes to rather than violates the law.235 The 
restriction of attendant conduct then must be necessary for 
valid remedial purposes such as effective enforcement, as 
we have seen. Moreover, courts are cautious in imposing 
this remedy and do so only after considering other options. 
Thus while courts have not articulated a standard that 
prophylaxis must be demonstrated to be the least 
 
229. See infra Part II.A. 
230. See infra text accompanying notes 238-43. 
231. See infra Part II.B. 
232. See infra text accompanying notes 293-306. 
233. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 391-92, 394-96 
(arguing that prophylactic remedy imposed as remedy of first choice, in the 
absence of defendant input or defiance, constituted an abuse of discretion). 
234. See supra Part I.A-B. 
235. See Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 629 (stating that the use of equitable 
discretion to order prophylactic remedies effectively enforces plaintiffs' rights, 
"but takes away the defendant's right to engage in perfectly legal conduct."). 
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restrictive alternative, in practice, the remedy has been 
applied only when it is crafted in the least restrictive 
manner and more permissive alternative remedies are not 
available.236 The Court's shorthand for this cautious use of 
prophylactic relief reiterated in the school desegregation 
and prison cases is that "the federal courts in devising a 
remedy must take into account the interests of state and 
local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent 
with the Constitution."237 
The first evidence of caution and consideration of the 
defendants' interests is the developed rule that courts must 
give defendants the first opportunity to avoid the harm.238 
Courts assessing the necessity for prophylactic relief must 
give the defendants the first opportunity to propose their 
own remedy for the harm once a finding of a legal violation 
has been made.239 The Supreme Court in Lewis v. Casey 
emphasized that this consideration is a requirement of the 
remedial process, and not a mere notion of deference.240 
Accordingly, eight Justices concurred that a critical defect 
in the case that would have alone justified reversal was the 
trial court's failure to give the state prison defendants the 
first opportunity to remedy the harm.241 Such a judicial step 
relies upon the significant expertise of the defendant in 
managing its own organization, and provides significant 
respect for the autonomy and self-governance of the 
 
236. And thus courts have interpreted the Prison Litigation Reform Act's 
requirement that prospective relief ordered in a prison conditions case be the 
"least restrictive necessary" as still permitting the continued use of prophylactic 
relief. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001). 
237. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977); See also Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) ("one of the most important considerations 
governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity 
and function of local government institutions"); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 
283 (5th Cir. 1977) ("We all understand, of course, that federal courts have no 
authority to address state officials out of office or to fire state employees or to 
take over the performance of their functions. Most assuredly, however, in 
proper cases a federal court can, and must, compel state officials or employees 
to perform their official duties in compliance with the Constitution of the 
United States."). 
238. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 818 (1977); Lewis v. Casey, 518 
U.S. 343, 362 (1996). 
239. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362, 393 (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 26-33 
(W.D.Mo. 1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986). 
240. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362-63, 393, 398. 
241. Id. 
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defendant in recognition of separation of powers 
concerns.242 Thus, it is the common practice of district 
courts to initially approve the defendants' remedial 
plans.243 
Only where defendants fail to propose or effectuate an 
adequate remedy is the court able to impose expansive 
prophylactic relief.244 Indeed, where the defendants fail to 
fashion an adequate remedy or comply with their own plan, 
the courts find a heightened need and stronger basis for 
awarding prophylactic relief.245 Accordingly, in the prison 
case of Hutto v. Finney, the district court gave the prison 
defendants two chances to devise their own plan for 
remedying the constitutional violations.246 The defendants' 
 
242. See id. at 361-63, 398. 
243. See Parker, supra note 18, at 494-95 (describing how the district court 
approved the defendants' plans in Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.Supp. 19 (W.D. 
Mo. 1985) with little change). However, courts evaluate the efficacy of the 
defendants' remedial proposal and do not simply rubber stamp their plan. See, 
e.g., Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1125 (D. Del. 1977) (evaluating 
defendants' remedial proposal for unconstitutional prison conditions and 
finding that "these proposals by the State represent an important initial step 
toward ameliorating the present conditions at DCC. If the State, however, is 
suggesting that any remedy for its violations of State law should be predicated 
upon its long range plans for building a new 48 bed maximum security facility 
and a new 300 bed facility, its position is untenable for several reasons."). 
244. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 
(1971) ("Remedial judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the 
shoes of the school authorities whose powers are plenary. Judicial authority 
enters only when local authority defaults."); see also William A. Fletcher, The 
Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 
YALE L.J. 635, 695-97 (1982) (concluding that courts should supplant state and 
local government only to the extent that those governments have demonstrated 
that they cannot be trusted to remedy the wrong). 
245. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 ("In default by the school authorities of their 
obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to 
fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system."); id. at 24 (noting 
that the school board had totally defaulted in its acknowledged duty to come 
forward with an acceptable remedial plan of its own, despite the patient efforts 
of the judge who on at least three occasions urged the board to submit plans). 
246. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) ("After finding the conditions of 
confinement unconstitutional, the District Court did not immediately impose a 
detailed remedy of its own. Instead, it directed the Department of Correction to 
'make a substantial start' on improving conditions and to file reports on its 
progress . . . . When the Department's progress proved unsatisfactory, a second 
hearing was held . . . . Again the court offered prison administrators an 
opportunity to devise a plan of their own for remedying the constitutional 
violations, but this time the court issued guidelines, identifying four areas of 
change that would cure the worst evils."). 
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failure to implement a remedial plan or to make any 
substantial progress on curing the harm then provided the 
basis for the district court, and subsequently the Supreme 
Court, to authorize prophylactic relief.247 The Court held: 
In fashioning a remedy, the District Court had ample authority to 
go beyond earlier orders and to address each element contributing 
to the violation. The District Court had given the Department 
repeated opportunities to remedy the cruel and unusual conditions 
in the isolation cells. If petitioners had fully complied with the 
court's earlier orders, the present time limit might well have been 
unnecessary. But taking the long and unhappy history of the 
litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a 
comprehensive order to insure against the risk of inadequate 
compliance.248 
Second, courts carefully assess the viability of other 
alternative relief before crafting their own protective 
measures.249 Prophylaxis is not generally the default 
remedial decision.250 Rather, it is commonly applied in an 
incremental manner, with the judge at each step of the case 
adding more specific measures as needed.251 Such 
incremental relief is needed where defendants have evaded 
a prior, less-restrictive prohibitory injunction.252 For 
 
247. Id. at 687. 
248. Id. 
249. See Landsberg, supra note 2, at 930 (concluding that prophylactic rules 
"provide a maximum remedy in cases where simple prohibitory rules are likely 
to fail."). 
250. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 448, 504 (1974) (denying prophylactic 
measure of prohibiting all state criminal prosecutions to remedy 
unconstitutional racially-motivated prosecutions because of "the availability of 
other avenues of relief open to respondents for the serious conduct they assert," 
including recusal of the judge, change of venue, sanction of the judge, post-
conviction appellate review, or federal habeas relief); FISS, supra note 65, at 14 
(describing the first decade of school desegregation remedies of the general 
structural command giving way to the specific prophylactic remedies of the 
second Brown decade in which courts began writing specific plans to cope with 
the absence of good faith on part of defendants to comply with the prior orders). 
251. See,  e.g., Justice Speech, supra note 14, 7-8. 
252. See FISS, supra note 65, at 36 (describing the gradualism of the 
conversion of a generalized structural injunction into a specific prophylactic 
order: "The usual scenario in the structural context is for the judge to issue a 
decree (perhaps embodying a plan formulated by the defendant), to be 
confronted with disobedience, and then not to inflict contempt but to grant a 
motion for supplemental relief. Then the cycle repeats itself. In each cycle of the 
supplemental relief process the remedial obligation is defined with greater and 
greater specificity."). 
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example, in the abortion protest case of Madsen, the trial 
court first enjoined the defendant protestors from 
blockading or blocking access to the abortion clinic.253 When 
the defendants failed to comply with that order, the court 
then crafted specific prophylactic measures to address the 
facilitators of the harm.254 Similarly, in the school 
desegregation cases, the Court first ordered the defendants 
to change the segregated school system255 and then to 
create a racially unified school system.256 It was only when 
those two general orders failed to achieve results that the 
courts turned to the specific prophylactic measures of 
requiring busing, quotas, and redistricting.257 Thus, the 
prior default of the defendant in failing to conform to a less 
restrictive injunction is a strong case for the imposition of 
prophylactic relief.258 
However, where the defendants have not violated prior 
orders or laws, alternative less restrictive remedies should 
be considered prior to the imposition of prophylactic 
measures. For example, in the school desegregation case of 
People Who Care the court invalidated a prophylactic 
measure forbidding the school district from tracking 
students by grouping students by ability.259 While there 
was some evidence that the school may have used tracking 
 
 253. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So.2d 664, 667 n.4 
(Fla. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health 
Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 254. Id. at 669. 
255. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 249, 301 (1955) (ordering 
preventive, structural relief requiring defendants to "admit to public schools on 
a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these 
cases"). 
256. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (ordering 
reparative, structural relief requiring the defendants to "take whatever steps 
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would 
be eliminated root and branch"). 
257. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16, 26 
(1971) (ordering prophylactic relief because of "the need for remedial criteria of 
sufficient specificity to assure a school authority's compliance with its 
constitutional duty" and the court's broad power to fashion a remedy that will 
assure a unitary school system "in default by the school authorities of their 
obligation to proffer acceptable remedies."). 
258. See Fletcher, supra note 244, at 637. "[R]emedial discretion in 
institutional suits is inevitably political in nature" and therefore "presumptively 
illegitimate" except when political bodies that should ordinarily exercise such 
discretion are "seriously and chronically in default" in which case judicial 
discretion is a "necessary" and "legitimate" substitute. Id. 
259. 111 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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to segregate white and black students, the court held that a 
lesser restrictive prophylactic measure was required.260 
Thus, the court could forbid the district from tracking 
students other than in accordance with criteria validated as 
objective and non-racist, but could not impose a blanket 
prohibition on the useful educational measure of 
tracking.261 
The failure to use prophylaxis appropriately as a 
fallback rather than a remedial starting point ultimately 
leads to claims of unfettered judicial activism as it did in 
Bush v. Gore.262 In the famous election case of 2000, the 
Supreme Court reacted to the unconstitutional recount 
ordered by the Florida Supreme Court by immediately 
imposing its own prophylactic remedy in the form of a four-
part process for a state recount.263 Then, finding that there 
was insufficient time actually to comply with these 
prophylactic measures, the Court halted any and all 
recounts in the election.264 This quick and dramatic default 
to prophylactic relief raised universal criticism265—which 
 
260. Id. ("Were abolition of tracking the only means of preventing the school 
district from manipulating the tracking system to separate races, it might be a 
permissible remedy. It is not the only way – as we take the plaintiffs implicitly 
to concede by accusing the school district of having placed white kids in higher 
tracks, and black kids in lower tracks, without always complying rigorously 
with objective criteria, such as scores on achievement tests. If that is the wrong, 
the remedy is obvious: forbid the district, on pain of contempt if the prohibition 
is flouted, to track students other than in accordance with criteria that have 
been validated as objective and nonracist. This form of remedy is not only 
proportioned to the violation and duly respectful of the autonomy of educators 
in matters educational; it also requires less administrative supervision by the 
special master . . . ."). 
261. Id. at 536. 
262. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 387-407. 
263. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam). The Court ordered: 
(1) the adoption of adequate statewide standards for determining what 
constitutes a "legal vote" after opportunity for argument; (2) practicable 
procedures to implement the standards; (3) orderly judicial review of any 
disputed matters; and (4) evaluation of the accuracy of vote tabulation 
equipment by the Florida Secretary of State. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. See Ward Farnsworth, "To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong": A 
User's Guide to Judicial Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227, 264 (2001) 
(concluding that the Court's remedial decision was "lawless" in that it "lacked 
an adequate legal foundation by traditional standards"); Michael W. McConnell, 
Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 660 (2001) 
(finding the Court's remedial decision "unsettling" and incorrect as a matter of 
law); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV 757, 767 (2001) 
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should be expected when a court fails to follow a more 
cautious approach to imposing prophylactic relief. In Bush 
v. Gore, the Supreme Court did not consider less restrictive 
alternatives such as the preventive relief of prohibiting the 
arbitrary recount or the reparative relief of requiring the 
Florida court to correct the infirmities of its 
unconstitutional recount.266 Instead, the Court jumped to 
its own control of the Florida election system without any 
evidence of the ineffectiveness of other less restrictive 
alternatives.267 
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, any court that 
imposes a prophylactic remedy must assess the inherent 
danger of prophylactic remedies of improperly restricting 
legal conduct. The burden to the defendant from the 
injunctive relief is a typical factor used by courts in 
evaluating the propriety and scope of injunctive relief.268 
Courts want to ensure that their own remedies do not 
restrict protected conduct, cause economic waste, or 
otherwise create unfairness. For the courts recognize that 
defendants obviously have an interest in continuing to 
engage in permissible conduct without the restriction of the 
court. Thus, the Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that 
in crafting injunctive remedies, courts owe special deference 
to public institutional defendants.269 Sometimes this 
 
(calling the Bush v. Gore remedy a "blunder" and the most difficult part of the 
opinion to defend on conventional legal grounds); Thomas, Prophylactic 
Remedies, supra note 1, at 387-401 (arguing that the remedial decision in Bush 
v. Gore was an abuse of discretion under applicable principles of equitable 
relief). 
266. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 391-98. 
267. Id. 
268. To qualify for injunctive relief, courts must consider the undue burden 
to the defendant from the imposition of the injunction. See DOBBS, supra note 
59, at 228; LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 282-89. In the context of broad equitable 
relief, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the interests of the defendants 
must be given proper deference. See also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361-62 
(1996). 
269. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-79 (1976) ("When a plaintiff 
seeks to enjoin the activity of a government agency, even within a unitary court 
system, his case must contend with the 'well-established rule that the 
Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch 
of its own internal affairs.'") (citations omitted). See also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 
498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (local 
public education); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (deferring to defendant 
prison officials); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995) (importance of 
local control over public education). 
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deference results in the invalidation of prophylactic 
measures.270 However, the deference principle is not a 
prohibition on regulating legal conduct through 
prophylaxis.271 Instead, the deference suggests a level of 
caution that serves to tailor and limit rather than to 
preclude the prophylactic remedy. 
The biggest threat from prophylactic remedies comes 
from measures that restrict affiliated conduct that is not 
only legal, but also protected behavior. For example, in the 
abortion protest cases of Schenck and Madsen, the Court 
parsed through the lower courts' prophylactic measures to 
ensure that they did not unduly restrict legal conduct 
protected by the First Amendment.272 In both cases, the 
Court struck down prophylactic measures that restricted 
not merely legal conduct of the defendant protestors, but 
constitutionally-protected conduct under the First 
Amendment.273 Due to the heightened protection accorded 
the legal conduct, the Court in Madsen invalidated 
prophylactic measures such as a ban on signs and protests 
at private homes and tailored other measures that were not 
necessary to achieve the protection from harm.274 The 
 
270. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 448, 502 (1974) (denying injunction 
prohibiting all state criminal prosecutions against plaintiffs to address harm of 
racially-motivated state prosecutions on the basis that "such a major continuing 
intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the daily conduct of 
state criminal proceedings is in sharp conflict with the principles of equitable 
restraint which this Court has recognized in the decisions previously noted."). 
271. Although, Justices Scalia and Thomas perhaps would argue to the 
contrary that courts cannot regulate any institutional conduct other than the 
primary conduct directly causing the harm. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357 (1996) 
(Scalia, J.) ("The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that 
produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established."); id. at 385 
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
272. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. 
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); cf. Thomas v. Chicago Park 
Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (upholding constitutionality of municipal park 
ordinance requiring individuals to obtain permit before conducting more-than-
50-person events: "The prophylaxis achieved by insisting upon a rigid, no-
waiver application of the ordinance requirements would be far outweighed, we 
think, by the accompanying senseless prohibition of speech (and of other 
activity in the park) by organizations that fail to meet the technical 
requirements of the ordinance but for one reason or another pose no risk of the 
evils that those requirements are designed to avoid."). 
273. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 357; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753. 
274. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 771 (tailoring buffer zone to reach only clinic 
rather than private property); id. at 773 (invalidating ban on images and signs 
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Schenck trial court subsequently attempted to fashion a 
prophylactic preliminary injunction to restrain the same 
type of abortion protesting while circumventing the 
problems identified in the Madsen decree.275 Again, though, 
the Supreme Court struck down some prophylactic 
measures as overly restrictive of defendants' legal and 
constitutionally protected conduct. 276 While such 
prophylactic measures were appropriate given the volatility 
of the protest conflict, the measures were still required to be 
carefully tailored so as not to impinge on the protestors' 
legal rights to free speech.277 
Thus, the reality of prophylaxis belies the scholarly spin 
that such remedies are disrespectful of the institutional 
concerns of public defendants. Instead, the case law 
demonstrates how prophylaxis is used only where 
necessary. Defendants are given the first opportunity to 
remedy that harm. If a court remedy is required, the court 
carefully considers less restrictive remedial options other 
than prophylaxis. Once the court selects prophylaxis, it 
carefully tailors each aspect of its prophylactic measures to 
respect the ability of the defendant to engage in legal 
conduct that facilitates harm. At each step of the remedial 
process, defendants are given priority in the creation and 
tailoring of the prophylactic remedy. Such remedial 
favoritism in favor of defendants, the wrongdoers, has led 
Professor Wendy Parker to accuse the judicial system of 
ceding too much remedial power to the defendants at the 
expense of plaintiffs' rights.278 Thus, what is apparent from 
 
observable in clinic); id. at 775 (invalidating blanket ban on picketing at 
employee residents finding that narrower time, place or manner restriction 
would have accomplished the desired result). 
275. See Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y. v. Project Rescue W.N.Y., 799 F. 
Supp. 1417 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). 
276. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 866-67 (striking down "floating buffer zones" 
prohibiting protestors from approaching within fifteen feet of individuals). 
277. Id. at 867 ("[W]e have before us a record that shows physically abusive 
conduct, harassment of the police that hampered law enforcement, and the 
tendency of even peaceful conversations to devolve into aggressive and 
sometimes violent conduct."). 
278. See Parker, supra note 18, at 479 (calling for courts to more carefully 
define the right and recognize their own remedial abilities in order to counter 
the current Supreme Court approach to school desegregation and public law 
remedies that cedes too much remedial power to the defendants thereby 
preventing lower court judges from undertaking principled, well-grounded 
public law remedies). See also Parker, supra note 79. 
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an examination of the prophylactic measures that have 
withstood challenge is that they restrict defendants' legal 
conduct only as a last remedial resort.279 
B. Crafting Prophylaxis in the Remedial Decisionmaking 
Process 
A practical, yet important question is how the judge 
formulates the specific measures that will constitute the 
prophylactic remedy. The standard assumption is that 
there is no process or criteria used to craft prophylaxis, but 
rather that the decree results out of whole cloth based on 
the judge's own personal view of how best to resolve the 
case.280 Such perceived indeterminacy and arbitrariness 
feeds the claims of the illegitimacy of prophylactic relief. 
However, the reality is that the courts, in crafting 
prophylactic measures, simply employ the traditional 
adjudicatory process and decisionmaking to make the 
remedial decision.281 The court conducts hearings, orders 
 
279. See FISS, supra note 65, at 13 ("With the structural injunction the story 
is more complicated: over time the decreed act becomes more and more specific, 
for example, detailing the dates on which choice forms are to be distributed, the 
ratio of blacks and whites in each school, the amount to be spent on books, etc. 
But this specificity emerges as a last resort. The original impulse in these 
structural cases was just the opposite – to use almost no specificity in 
describing the act required."). 
280. See LASSER, supra note 8, at 222-43 (describing the Reagan-era 
criticisms of the Supreme Court cases involving desegregation, criminal 
procedure, prisons, voting, etc. as a "jurisprudence of idiosyncrasy" 
unrestrained by anything but the judges' own policy preferences). See also 
Diver, supra note 12, at 62 ("First, a remedial decree is a complex and 
contingent exercise in prediction. It calls for speculation about the behavior of 
individuals and human institutions under conditions of unusual stress— 
judgments likely to be based more on 'feel,' on the ineffable deposit of 
experience, than on objectively verifiable evidence."); Justice Speech, supra note 
14, at 7 ("Where I am most accused of activism is with respect to the broad and 
comprehensive remedies that I have ordered in institutional reform cases. Some 
say that I have usurped the power of the state legislature, meddled in areas 
beyond the expertise of the court, and imposed my own philosophy and 
sociological conclusions. I disagree wholeheartedly with these allegations, and I 
would move to quash the indictment."); Mishkin, supra note 71, at 960-65. 
281. See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False 
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 
B.U. L. REV. 1273 (1995); Parker, supra note 79, at 1623. Cf. Theodore 
Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in 
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Justice Speech, supra note 
14, at 7 ("When properly practiced, remedial activism is completely consistent 
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briefings, receives evidence, and appoints experts as 
necessary to gather the facts relevant to deciding the 
remedial question of what facilitators to address in 
prophylactic relief.282 The prophylactic measures are not 
judge invented, but rather judge incorporated from the 
existing record. As Judge Justice of the Eastern District of 
Texas stated in describing his process for adopting 
prophylactic and structural remedies in prison litigation 
cases: "I created none of this out of whole cloth. Rather, the 
facts of the case and the testimony of eminent experts 
supported the necessity of each and every step to remedy 
the clearly established constitutional violations."283 The 
important reality is that judges are limited in crafting 
prophylactic relief to the evidence presented in the record, 
and thus are generally precluded from basing these 
remedies on matters external to the case.284 
Academics, however, have missed the reality of the 
routine adjudication of remedies.285 Since the advent of 
prophylactic relief, it has been suggested by scholars that 
remedial decisionmaking of a public nature cannot be done 
within the traditional adjudicatory process, but rather 
requires a specialized remedial process.286 The assertion is 
 
with the obligation of a district court judge to determine the existence of 
constitutional injuries and impose appropriate remedies based upon the 
evidence adduced in the case."). 
282. See Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 7 ("the adversarial nature of the 
judicial process—particularly the consideration of the testimony of expert 
witnesses—enables the court to order remedies that are neither arbitrary, 
tyrannical, nor the products of its own imagination, but rather remedies that 
flow logically from the court's findings in the case."). 
283.  Id. at 8-9. 
284. See Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1124 (D. Del. 1977) 
("Those same individuals testified housing classification becomes impeded 
unless eight to ten percent of the beds used for permanent housing of convicted 
inmates are not occupied. Accordingly, the aggregate existing and future design 
capacity of DCC will be reduced by eight percent to determine the maximum 
capacity of DCC before classification to housing becomes impeded."); see also 
Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 486 (discussing how judges imposing 
prophylactic remedies are limited by the record built by the parties, evidentiary 
rules, and the requirement to base its findings supporting prophylactic relief 
upon the record). 
285. See Bone, supra note 281, at 1275 (arguing that the dichotomy between 
private and public law litigation has been mischaracterized and 
misunderstood); Parker, supra note 79, at 1627 (calling into serious question 
the public law model of litigation in which the judge acts in an atypical, activist 
manner). 
286. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 
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that legal claims pertaining to the broader public interest 
require a "consensus-based" process allowing participation 
by multiple stakeholders and policy decisions that fall 
outside the judicial realm.287 In other words, advocates 
argue that public law solutions require alternative dispute 
resolution rather than traditional adjudication.288 
It is certainly true that crafting legal remedies is 
quintessential "problem solving" and thus effectively, and 
perhaps most effectively, can be done through ADR.289 
However, that is true in each and every case: ADR allows 
parties in all cases to have self-determination, 
participation, knowledge, and result maximization that 
often is missing from the litigation process.290 The reality is 
that ADR does not always succeed. Parties fail to reach a 
settlement, defendants fail to comply with an agreement,291 
or the plaintiff believes that a court judgment can better 
 
GEO. L. J. 1355 (1991) (proposing a specialized deliberative process akin to 
mediation to resolve public law remedies); Diver, supra note 12, at 63 
("Adjudication is not well suited to such an enterprise. Its logic seeks to cast the 
multipolar, shifting relationships in institutions into a static and precisely 
defined conflict. It looks for an optimal, comprehensive, and final solution 
rather than an incremental, continual adjustment of interests. The adjudicatory 
model demands objective verifiability, not instinctive feel. It treats institutions 
as intelligent, organic actors capable of implementing rational objectives 
through consistent patterns of behavior, and it relies on the invocation of 
authority and the threat of coercive sanctions to induce changes in behavior."); 
Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) 
(arguing that polycentric problems of public nature are not suit to resolution in 
the bipolar legal dispute process). 
287. See Sturm, supra note 286, at 1357. 
288. Id.; see also Molly Townes O'Brien, At the Intersection of Public Policy 
and Private Process: Court-Ordered Mediation and the Remedial Process in 
School Funding Litigation, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391 (2003). But see 
OWEN FISS, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 90-104 (2003) (reprinting Against 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984), and arguing strongly against the use of 
ADR to resolve public law litigation). 
289. See Minow, supra note 9 (describing use of mediation, early neutral 
evaluators); O'Brien, supra note 288, at 394 (arguing that Ohio school funding 
case could best be resolved through a complex mediation process involving 
multiple stakeholders and occurring after the judicial determination of core 
rights). 
290. See LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
AND LAWYERS 2 (2d ed. 1997). 
291. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 97 F.Supp.2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(failing to reach settlement through negotiation or court-ordered mediation 
after liability determination finding that defendant corporation violated the 
antitrust laws). 
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protect her rights.292 In the absence of a private agreement, 
judges are charged with crafting a remedy to respond to the 
established violation. Thus, ultimately, courts must be able 
to formulate reasoned decisions as to appropriate 
prophylactic relief in a given case. 
In order to collect the information necessary to crafting 
prophylactic relief, the court utilizes the same adjudicatory 
process used in every case to determine questions of fact 
and liability and remedies such as damages.293 Courts 
deciding whether and how to craft prophylactic relief rely 
upon hearings, arguments, briefs, evidence, witnesses and 
experts to assess the relevant facts and law.294 The 
remedial decision is generally rendered following a 
bifurcated phase of the trial devoted to hearing evidence 
and argument about the remedial question whether the 
remedy sought is an injunction or damages.295 In chastising 
 
292. See Judge Harry Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or 
Anathema? 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 676 (1986) (stating there is "real reason for 
concern" if ADR is extended to resolve difficult issues of constitutional or public 
law by making use of non-legal values to resolve important social issues or 
allow public officers to avoid their duties and obligations); Owen M. Fiss, 
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that settlement is not 
generally preferable to a judicial decision); Trina Grillo, The Mediation 
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L. J. 1545 (1991) (arguing 
that mediation, and particularly mandatory mediation, is harmful to women in 
divorce and domestic violence cases); Judith Resnick, Failing Faith: 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 545 (1986) 
("Adjudication is far from perfect. But what it offers is decisionmaking by 
government-empowered individuals who have some accountability both to the 
immediate recipients of the decisions and to the public at large."). 
293. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
("But a prediction about future events is not, as a prediction, any less a factual 
issue."); United States v. Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated 
by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Parker, supra note 79. 
294. See Fletcher, supra note 244, at 656-57 (discussing the typical litigation 
tools judges use to make an informed decision about issuing affirmative 
injunctions including testimony, hearings, special masters, intervenors, and 
amicus briefs). For example, in Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. 
Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), this author, as one of the counsel for plaintiffs in the 
case, presented evidence on the remedy issue though expert testimony, expert 
reports, document evidence, and demonstrative evidence during the liability 
phase of the trial. 
295. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1997) 
(indicating trial court conducted twenty-seven days of hearings regarding 
compliance with temporary injunction and proper scope of preliminary relief); 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 7 (1971) (indicating 
district court held numerous hearings and received voluminous evidence as to 
prophylactic remedy for school desegregation). See also Hart v. Comty. Sch. Bd. 
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the Microsoft district court for failing to conduct such a 
remedial hearing, the appellate court reiterated the 
important adjudicatory requirements of remedial 
decisionmaking: 
The District Court's remedies-phase proceedings are a different 
matter. It is a cardinal principle of our system of justice that 
factual disputes must be heard in open court and resolved through 
trial-like evidentiary proceedings. Any other course would be 
contrary to the spirit which imbues our judicial tribunals 
prohibiting decision without hearing. A party has the right to 
judicial resolution of disputed facts not just as to the liability 
phase, but also as to appropriate relief. Normally, an evidentiary 
hearing is required before an injunction may be granted. . . . Other 
than a temporary restraining order, no injunctive relief may be 
entered without a hearing. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. A 
hearing on the merits—i.e., a trial on liability—does not substitute 
for a relief-specific evidentiary hearing unless the matter of relief 
was part of the trial on liability, or unless there are no disputed 
factual issues regarding the matter of relief.296 
In these supplemental remedial proceedings, the 
attorneys for the plaintiffs present their remedial demands 
and the defendants present their denial or counter-
demands for appropriate relief.297 The plaintiffs initially 
frame the context of potential relief, often placing a 
particular remedy up for debate or excluding a remedy from 
the range of potential options.298 Defendants present their 
own interests as to the specific remedies proposed, 
including cost and implementation concerns.299 Initially, 
 
of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 769, 769-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); People Who Care v. 
Rockford Bd of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 533 (7th Cir. 1997) (conducting designated 
hearings for remedial phase of school desegregation case). 
296. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See 
Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (in 
which the evidentiary matters regarding the remedial issues where presented 
during the liability phase of trial primarily by plaintiffs' experts). 
297. See United States v. Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 61 (D.D.C. 2000) 
("The Court has been presented by plaintiffs with a proposed form of final 
judgment that would mandate both conduct modification and structural 
reorganization by the defendant when fully implemented. Microsoft has 
responded with a motion for summary rejection of structural reorganization and 
a request for months of additional time to oppose the relief sought in all other 
respects."), vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
298. See Parker, supra note 79, at 1627 (describing how the parties initiate 
the matters to be decided by the court in the remedial process). 
299. E.g., Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 61, n.1 ("Microsoft's attorneys were 
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these interests of the defendants are given presumptive 
weight as the court gives the defendants the first 
opportunity to remedy the violation independently.300 The 
parties' experts present evidence and testimony about 
appropriate prophylactic relief by including their industry 
expertise as to what measures are likely to be successful in 
avoiding the harm.301 
The court might then supplement the parties' 
presentations using commonly-available litigation tools. For 
example, the court might appoint a special master or a 
court-appointed expert to investigate the facts, conduct fact-
finding hearings, or to interview and consult with those 
affected by the potential remedial decision.302 The court 
 
promptly able to tender a 35-page 'Offer of Proof,' summarizing in detail the 
testimony 16 witnesses would give to explain why plaintiffs' proposed remedy, 
in its entirety, is a bad idea."). The judge might also seek more information from 
defendants other than those in direct control of the institution. See Davis v. 
Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (cooperation of state 
governor and attorney general in suit directed at state mental hospital); Gates 
v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 897 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (conference between court 
and parties open to interested state and federal officials), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 
(5th Cir. 1974). 
300. See supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text (discussing procedural 
requirement that defendants be given the first opportunity to draft remedial 
plan or remedy the harm); Special Project, The Remedial Process in 
Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 797-99, 803 (1978) 
(describing the judicial practice of "remedial abstention" by which the court 
defers to the defendants' creation of an injunctive remedy); Parker, supra note 
79, at 1628 (criticizing the largely deferential stance of courts to defendants' 
preferences in crafting injunctive relief under which defendants are very likely 
to win); e.g., United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 485 (W.D. Va. 1994) 
(deferring to defendant's proposed remedial plan establishing separate military 
schools for men and women), aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 518 U.S. 
515 (1996) (holding that remedy violated equal protection). 
301. E.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1997) 
(supporting prophylactic measure of buffer zone with testimony of one of 
petitioners' witnesses during evidentiary hearing); People Who Care v. Rockford 
Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging the utility of 
expert testimony both at the liability and remedial stage of the lawsuit, but 
limiting the expert testimony to properly admissible evidence in accordance 
with Daubert); Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634 
(D.D.C. 1994); Fletcher, supra note 244, at 657 (stating that the expert provides 
information regarding the remedial decision by testifying to a consensus among 
members of his or her particular profession). 
302. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 8 
(1971) (finding defendant's remedial plan unacceptable and appointing 
educational expert to prepare remedial plan for school desegregation); People 
Who Care, 111 F.3d at 533 (referring remedial phase of school desegregation 
litigation to magistrate judge pursuant to the parties' consent who then 
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might allow intervention or permit amicus briefs to be filed 
in the case in order to obtain information from interested 
third parties.303 Further discovery on the remedial issues 
could be ordered.304 The judge might locate relevant 
remedial precedent from other courts regarding the types of 
prophylactic measures ordered in similar cases.305 
Alternatively, the judge might view for himself a location or 
other key aspect of the case.306 
Once the court has sufficient informational inputs, it 
must then engage in the remedial decisionmaking process 
by which it selects and crafts the particular remedy.307 This 
 
appointed a special master pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 53 to hear evidence 
relevant to the remedy and craft a remedial plan); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. Of 
Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 769, 769-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (utilizing special master's 
work and proposed remedial plan in developing court's own injunctive remedy). 
See Justice, supra note 9, at 27 (describing the use of special masters to present 
"the viewpoints about liability and remedy not otherwise likely to be expressed 
by the participants in the lawsuit"); Fletcher, supra note 236, at 656-57 
(describing use of special masters, magistrates, and experts in remedial process 
of institutional injunctions); Special Project, supra note 296, at 805-09 
(describing use of masters and experts in remedial process and collecting case 
examples). But see Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 930 (invalidating the use of a 
special officer as part of the remedy itself to oversee and investigate future 
instances of sexual harassment and assault in the women's prison). 
303. E.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 11 (accepting remedial plan submitted by non-
party United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare); Fletcher, 
supra note 236, at 656-57; Justice, supra note 9, at 26-27 (describing the judicial 
use of litigating amici to craft injunctive relief); Special Project, supra note 290, 
at 804; see, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 1 
(N.D. Ala. 1974); Chance v. Bd. of Exam'rs, 330 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971); see also Hart, 383 F. Supp. at 770 (summarizing the remedial phase of 
the case in which "the court received communications from various groups and 
persons affected"). 
304. Parker, supra note 79, at 1653 nn.167-70 (collecting cases where judges 
have ordered additional discovery to determine possible remedial measures). 
305. Cf. Swann, 402 U.S. at 27 ("The maps submitted in these cases 
graphically demonstrate that one of the principal tools employed by school 
planners and by courts to break up the dual school system has been a frank—
and sometimes drastic—gerrymandering of school districts and attendance 
zones."); United States v. Microsoft Corp, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2000) 
("The proposed final judgment is represented to the Court as incorporating 
provisions employed successfully in the past."), vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
306. See Hart, 383 F. Supp. at 770 ("With the consent of the parties, the 
court again viewed Coney Island and its environs.") 
307. See Special Project, supra note 296, at 802 (describing the manner in 
which judges select appropriate injunctive remedies); Justice Speech, supra 
note 14, at 8 ("After almost a year of exhaustively reviewing the trial testimony 
and the proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties, I ordered 
 2004] THE PROPHYLACTIC REMEDY 169 
remedial process essentially is judicial problem solving 
through which the court determines the appropriate 
remedial solution by 1) identifying the interests of the 
parties, 2) generating and evaluating options, and 3) 
separating the people from the problem.308 The court must 
first separate the people from the problem by remaining 
impartial and not reacting to the personalities of the parties 
or himself.309 Instead, the court bases the remedial solution 
on objective criteria such as legal principles, tangible data, 
evidence, or other resources presented in the record.310 The 
court identifies the relevant interests of the parties 
including practicality, fairness, retribution, or funding 
readily identifiable from the evidence and briefs presented 
by the parties.311 Finally, the court then generates possible 
remedial options from the suggestions of the parties, 
experts, evidence, or legal precedent.312 Then, the court 
 
comprehensive relief coextensive with the wholesale constitutional violations.") 
308. E.g., ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES 10-
12 (1981); Robert MacCrate, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the 
Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO  
BAR 138-40 (1992), (identifying problem solving as the first of ten fundamental 
skills necessary for competency lawyering); see generally Minow, supra note 9 
(describing Judge Weinstein's role as a problem solver in crafting public law 
remedies). 
309. Where the judge has failed to remain impartial and crafted injunctive 
relief based on the people in the case, the remedy has been overturned. United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 110-11, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (vacating 
structural and prophylactic relief ordered based in part on disqualification of 
judge who based remedy on his own personal animosity towards defendant 
Microsoft and its CEO, Bill Gates); see Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 61-62 
(implying in rendering remedial decision that defendant failed to use good faith 
in negotiations or in compliance with liability determination and accusing 
defendant of being "untrustworthy" and "disingenuous"). 
310. See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 302, at 802. 
311. E.g., id. at 803; Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63 (weighing in favor of 
plaintiffs' remedial proposal: "Plaintiffs won the case, and for that reason alone 
have some entitlement to a remedy of their choice. Moreover, plaintiffs' 
proposed final judgment is the collective work product of senior antitrust law 
enforcement officials of the United States Department of Justice and the 
Attorneys General of 19 states, in conjunction with multiple consultants. These 
officials are by reason of office obliged and expected to consider—and to act in—
the public interest; Microsoft is not."). 
312. E.g., Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. Of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 769, 770-71 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (considering three remedial plans submitted by the defendants, 
the special master, and the plaintiffs' expert); Special Project, supra note 302, 
at 802 ("Judicial selection of the systemic remedy, after receipt of suggestions 
from all the parties, is a common alternative to judicial imposition of a remedy 
or judicial non-involvement in remedy formulation. A court seeking the 
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uses traditional decisionmaking tools such as cost-benefit 
analysis or balancing of the equities of fairness and social 
justice to select from among the possible alternatives.313 
This routine remedial process for imposing prophylactic 
remedies conducted within the typical judicial proceedings 
thus effectuates the norms valued in legitimate judicial 
decisionmaking: participation, impartiality, and reasoned 
decisions.314 
The court does not simply endorse its own preferred 
moral agenda, but instead designs the prophylactic remedy 
to conform to the evidence presented at trial and the 
judicial precedents. Again, as Judge Justice described: 
[T]he determination results from the application of judicial 
precedents and factual reality, which the adversarial process is 
designed to foster. Simply ordering the Texas prison to hire more 
prison guards based purely on my personal opinion would have 
been both an arbitrary and an arrogant use of power. Every aspect 
of the relief that I ordered was based on the evidence presented in 
my court.315 
The prophylactic remedy must be justified through a 
reasoned decision in which the court supports the particular 
remedy with evidence in the record. If the judge fails to 
follow the adjudicatory process and conform the remedy to 
the factual findings, the injunction is subject to reversal as 
it was in Lewis v. Casey.316 As the concurring Justices 
emphasized, the problem with the broad prison library 
injunction was its "overreaching of the evidentiary record" 
in ordering relief that was not justified or even supported 
by the factual findings in the case.317 Thus, courts are 
limited to reacting to the legal problem as presented to it 
and are constrained by the particular application to crafting 
 
participation of the parties in remedy formulation first solicits their ideas, 
plans, and supporting information, and then either accepts one suggested plan 
in toto or devises its own plan out of the several proposals."). 
313. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 5, 13-17 (describing the 
decisionmaking process of the court in prison litigation cases involve identifying 
a range of alternatives and selecting the best option using a cost-benefit 
analysis). 
314. Sturm, supra note 286, at 1435-36; see also Fuller, supra note 286, at 
365-66, 372. 
315. Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 10. 
316. 518 U.S. 343, 359 (1996). 
317. Id. at 393-94, 397-98 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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prophylactic remedies within the confines of that case 
presentation.318 
III. THE NECESSITY OF PROPHYLACTIC REMEDIES 
Courts consistently resort to prophylactic remedies 
because they are necessary to providing effective relief to 
plaintiffs.319 Other remedies both injunctive and monetary 
are unable to provide meaningful relief to plaintiffs who 
have proven a violation of important, but often intangible, 
rights.320 The prophylactic remedy fulfills this remedial 
need by providing a judicial mechanism to address the 
definitional and functional inadequacies of other remedies. 
Yet the construct of prophylaxis that continues to 
dominate legal thinking is that of a remedy that gives 
plaintiff more than she needs or deserves thereby 
"overprotecting" legal rights.321 While Professor Schoenbrod 
explained twenty years ago how prophylaxis does not in fact 
give something extra,322 but rather gives the plaintiff 
precisely what she is entitled to by extra measures, the 
 
318. Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 9 ("Furthermore, even in a so-called 
public law institutional reform case, the judge is still constrained by certain 
hallmarks of judicial decisionmaking: (1) the judge must make a decision on 
every grievance presented; (2) the judge must listen to the witnesses and 
arguments of both sides; and (3) the judge must justify his decision. These 
safeguards—which, I emphasize, are not imposed on state legislators and 
executive officers, who also make decisions profoundly affecting the welfare of 
the community—make it more likely that a judge's decision regarding the 
remedy to be imposed will be reliable and well- considered."); cf. Hamilton & 
Schoenbrod, supra note 33, at 487 (explaining that Section 5 remedies are more 
powerful than typical judicial constitutional remedies because Congress can 
apply the remedy across the board to others outside the context of the case). 
319. Monaghan, supra note 15, at 21; Landsberg, supra note 2, at 965; 
Justice, supra note 9, at 9. 
320. Alternative injunctive remedies are often ineffective because they are 
vague or avoidable. Damages are ineffective because the loss of intangible 
rights is difficult to measure in monetary terms, see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 
247 (1978), or difficult to collect from immune state defendants, see U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. 
321. See supra note 123, accompanying text, and sources cited. The notion of 
prophylaxis as overprotecting legal rights was first put forth by Henry 
Monaghan who advocated in favor of such rules and remedies. See Monaghan, 
supra note 15, at 21 ("A prophylactic rule might be constitutionally compelled 
when it is necessary to overprotect a constitutional right because a narrow, 
theoretically more discriminating rule may not work in practice."). 
322. See Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 671; see also supra note 136 and 
accompanying text. 
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question persists as to the real necessity for prophylactic 
relief. For example, in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
targeted attacks on structural and prophylactic relief 
intended to eliminate the use of prophylactic remedies by 
requiring that any prospective relief imposed by a federal 
court be "necessary" to correcting a constitutional 
violation.323 The implication is that prophylactic relief is not 
necessary to vindicate legal rights. 
As previously discussed, however, prophylactic 
remedies are important—and indeed integral—to 
interpreting and implementing legal rights.324 The 
prophylactic remedy uniquely is able to translate abstract 
rights into meaningful relief.325 Its measures exemplify the 
right, thereby defining the right in a way that allows it to 
become cognitively tangible. In addition, the prophylactic 
remedy has the capacity to effectively implement the right 
through the use of its specific directives.326 The unique 
functional abilities of the prophylactic remedy to counter 
the defendant's resistance to compliance, provide precise 
notice to the defendant of expected conduct, and facilitate 
the court's oversight make it a particularly effective choice 
to enforce intangible rights.327 
A. Definitional Need to Translate Abstract Rights 
The unique capability of the prophylactic remedy to 
translate abstract rights into tangible meaning is perhaps 
its greatest asset.328 The intangible rights at issue in the 
prophylactic remedies cases present challenges to the court 
as to how to translate those rights into tangible meaning.329 
 
323. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
324. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. 
325. Levinson, supra note 71, at 874 ("The definition of most or all rights 
incorporates 'remedial' prophylactic rules."); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra 
note 33, at 692 (explaining that "[prophylactic] remedies are used by courts to 
provide a tangible and workable definition to the otherwise amorphous 
constitutional proscription . . ."). 
326. See infra Part III.B. 
327. See id. 
328. Cf. Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 33, at 687-95 (describing how 
remedies generally are unified with the right so that the remedies define the 
meaning of the substantive guarantee); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 
92 YALE L. J. 585, 587 (1983) (stating that remedies generally "give meaning to 
ideals" in order that they "be effective in the real world"). 
329. Justice, supra note 9, at 1 ("The values that we find in our 
 2004] THE PROPHYLACTIC REMEDY 173 
These cases all involve issues of paramount importance due 
to the priority of the attendant right, the nature of public 
law litigation, or the threat to personal liberty.330 Yet the 
vagueness of traditional injunctive remedies prevents the 
court from conveying to the parties a tangible reality of the 
operative right. 
For example, traditional equitable remedies for race 
discrimination might order the defendant to "stop 
discriminating," or to "not discriminate against the plaintiff 
in the future."331 These commands are too vague even for 
the well-intentioned defendant—what does it mean to stop 
discriminating? What must the defendant do or not do?332 
For example, in Hughey v. JMS Development Corp.,333 the 
trial court's injunction stated: "[Defendant shall] not 
discharge stormwater into the waters of the United States 
from its development property . . . if such discharge would 
be in violation of the Clean Water Act."334 The appellate 
court vacated the injunction due to the inability of it or the 
defendant to determine what the injunction meant: "Was 
 
Constitution . . . are ambiguous. They are capable of a great number of different 
meanings. . . . There is a need –– a constitutional need –– to give them specific 
meaning, to give them operational content . . . . "). 
330. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 389-90. 
331. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1202 (11th Cir. 
1999) (denying as too broad appellants' request for an injunction to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race in all its annexation decisions); Payne v. 
Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1978) (reversing on specificity 
grounds the District Court's injunction, which prohibited defendants from 
discriminating on the basis of color, race, or sex in employment practices). 
332. CF & I Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 507 F.2d 170 (10th 
Cir. 1974) (holding that injunctive decree is vague when the delineation of the 
proscribed activity lacks particularity, or when it contains only an abstract 
conclusion of law rather than an operative command capable of enforcement); 
see Parker, supra note 18, at 514 (1999) ("Knowing that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits states from establishing "separate but equal" schools 
based on race tells us little about the nature of the right. What does it mean to 
be free from racial discrimination in public schools? Do children have a right to 
attend an integrated school; or a more limited right to attend an integrated 
school to the extent feasible using the students within the school district lines; 
or an even more limited right to attend schools with race-neutral attendance 
zones? In addition, does the right include anything other than student 
assignment?") (citation omitted). See also Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 7 ("If 
a decree is only in general terms, such a defendant will find it easy to disobey 
and defy the decree without fear of contempt, by making the contention that the 
order is too vague to guide future conduct."). 
333. 78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996). 
334. Id. at 1524. 
 174 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
JMS supposed to stop the rain from falling? Was JMS to 
build a retention pond to slow and control discharges? 
Should JMS have constructed a treatment plan to comply 
with the requirements of the CWA?"335 Indeed, courts 
routinely invalidate such broad "obey the law" injunctions 
that fail to provide the defendant with a clear directive.336 
And defendants often ignore such commands and continue 
to do business as usual.337 Legalistic guarantees against 
"discrimination," "pollution," or "unconstitutional action," 
standing alone are abstract in meaning. 
Prophylactic measures correct this void by translating 
the abstract right by exemplification.338 The tangible 
measures of prophylaxis exemplify the meaning of the right 
in the specific case context.339 Explanation by example is a 
 
335. Id. at 1531. 
336. LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 236; JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING 
REMEDIES 290 (1999). E.g., Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of 
Health and Rehab Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1223 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The 
preliminary injunction in this case differs little from an 'obey the law' order 
because it fails to identify with adequate detail and precision how Defendants 
are to perform such critical obligations as 'adequately reimbursing providers of 
care' and 'complying with the substantive requirements of' the Medicaid Act."); 
Burton, 178 F.3d at 1201 (dismissing plaintiff's discrimination claim because of 
lack of any remedy to redress harm because the injunction sought by appellants 
"would do no more than instruct the City to 'obey the law'"); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 668 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990) (invalidating as vague a provision 
of an injunction in school desegregation cases stating: "The duty imposed by the 
law and by this interim decree is the desegregation of schools and the 
maintenance of that condition. The defendants are directed to use their 
expertise and resources to comply with the constitutional requirement of equal 
education opportunity for all who are entitled to the benefits of public education 
in Denver, Colorado."); Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 898 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (refusing to enforce injunction that prohibited "discrimination"); see 
also Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 10, 125-26 (1948) 
(overturning injunction prohibiting monopolization). But see Ennels v. Ala. Inns 
Assocs., 581 F.Supp. 708, 709-10 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (affirming injunction 
prohibiting defendant's "discrimination in admitting or serving blacks" rather 
than requiring the enumeration of specific practices because of "[m]an's 
ingenuity in devising methods to discriminate 'in offering or serving' black 
patrons is infinite."). 
337. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) 
(explaining defendant school board's argument in motion for contempt that its 
inaction was due to the fact that it never understood what the injunction meant 
prohibiting "no majority of any minority" schools). 
338. Levinson, supra note 71, at 885 ("[T]he definition of a right may 
effectively incorporate a remedy, most commonly the equivalent of a 
prophylactic, preventive injunction."). 
339. See Justice, supra note 9, at 50 ("The Constitution does not say 
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common way to understand a concept by illustrating its 
meaning rather than using a synonym, antonym or 
description. For example, the meaning of "hot" could be 
illustrated by the examples of a fire, stove,340 or chili 
pepper341 rather than describing it as the "opposite of cold" 
or "capable of burning" or "giving off heat."342 Similarly, 
prophylactic measures provide tangible illustrations of the 
meaning of the abstract right.343 For example, to describe 
what it means to not "discriminate" in the workplace, the 
court might choose a synonym prohibiting a "hostile 
environment," an antonym requiring "equal opportunity" or 
a contextual description of prohibiting discrimination "in 
the hiring and promotion of employees."344 Alternatively, 
the court might illustrate the right to be free of gender 
discrimination by example through prophylactic measures 
directing anti-harassment policies, pornography-free 
workspace, and education of employees. In this way, the 
prophylactic remedy exemplifies the legal guarantee, 
clearly and comprehensively conveying the content of the 
right. 
Prophylaxis translates rights, but does not itself 
transubstantiate into an independent right.345 The 
prophylactic remedy does not convert the measure into a 
new right.346 However, prophylaxis is commonly 
 
anything about reports, showers, or isolation cells; much less does it say 
anything about the date reports are due, the temperature of showers, or the 
maximum number of days that can be spent in an isolation cell. But it does say 
something about equality and humane treatment, and a court trying to give 
meaning to those values may find it both necessary and appropriate – as a way 
of bringing the organization within the bounds of the Constitution – to issue 
directives on these matters."). 
340. See definitions of "hot," available at http://www.dictionary.com (citing 
WEBSTER'S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1998)); WordNet 1.6, Princeton 
University (1997)) (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). 
341. See id. (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 41, 
available at http://www.bartleby.com). 
342. Id. 
343. E.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Women 
Prisoners v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994). 
344. E.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1999); 
Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1978). 
345. Contra Levinson, supra note 71, at 857. 
346. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 381-84. Cf. New York 
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (declaring that Miranda's prophylactic 
measures "are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution . . . .") 
(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). 
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misperceived as the judicial creation of a new right.347 This 
"remedial incorporation," by which the remedy seems to 
become a part of the right, is prevalent with prophylactic 
remedies.348 The specificity of prophylactic measures 
provides a tangible measure to grasp when trying to 
effectuate the legal guarantees in real life, and thus often 
the remedy takes on the mirage of its own right.349 For 
example, in the prison context the prophylactic measure of 
a law library to facilitate the right of prisoner access to the 
courts seemed to evolve into a right in itself.350 Similarly, in 
the right to counsel context, the Anders brief process for 
withdrawing from representation became a new right in 
practice.351 And in the desegregation context, prophylactic 
measures addressing housing segregation seemed to 
transubstantiate into the right against de facto 
segregation.352 
However, the courts have strictly blocked this 
definitional expansion of the substantive guarantee. In 
Lewis v. Casey, the Court struck down structural and 
prophylactic relief redressing inadequacies in the prison 
 
347.  Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 362; Grano, supra 
note 7, at 101-06 ("What distinguishes a prophylactic rule from a true 
constitutional rule is the possibility of violating the former without actually 
violating the Constitution. A decision that promulgates or employs a 
prophylactic rule will not attempt to demonstrate an actual violation of the 
defendant's constitutional rights under review."); Klein, supra note 22, at 1032 
(defining "prophylactic rule" as a legal requirement that "may be triggered by 
less than a showing that the explicit rule was violated . . . ."). 
348. Levinson, supra note 71, at 899-904 ("[R]emedial incorporation means 
defining a constitutional right prophylactically to forbid at least some laws or 
policies that would be permissible if considered in isolation."). 
349. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 382-83. 
350. Id. at 385 (discussing phenomenon of remedial incorporation in prison 
library cases). Compare Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (imposing 
prophylactic measure of prison law library) with Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 
348-49, 351 (1996) (rejecting as insufficient a cause of action based on failure to 
provide adequate law library). See also Levinson, supra note 71, at 878-82 
(discussing remedial incorporation generally in prison condition cases). 
351. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 385 (discussing 
remedial incorporation in context of withdrawal of counsel). Compare Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (requiring counsel to prepare brief advising 
court of lack of merit of appeal before withdrawing from case in order to prevent 
harm from denial of counsel) with Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) 
(holding that Anders procedure is not required right itself). 
352. Levinson, supra note 71, at 874-77 (describing how the remedies in 
school desegregation cases seemed to redefine the right from prohibition of de 
jure segregation to prohibition of de facto segregation). 
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law library because there was no right to a library per se.353 
Instead, the library was merely a prophylactic measure 
designed in the prior case of Bounds v. Smith to ensure the 
plaintiffs' rights of access to the court.354 Similarly, in 
Smith v. Robbins, the Court went to great lengths to 
explain that the Anders procedure is simply a prophylactic 
process to protect against the denial of counsel and not a 
right itself.355 Thus, a plaintiff could not sue for the failure 
to comply with the Anders procedure, and the State of 
California could create substitute measures to protect the 
right to counsel.356 In the desegregation cases, the Court 
repeatedly has affirmed that the equal protection right 
itself extends only to de jure segregation.357 Prophylactic 
remedies may redress de jure segregation by reaching the 
de facto contributors of that harm, but they may not 
address de facto segregation in the absence of a 
constitutional violation.358 
The import of these cases is clear: prophylactic 
remedies are not rights. This means first, that plaintiffs 
may not base their lawsuit on the violation of the 
prophylaxis.359 Litigants may not sue for the mere denial or 
inadequacy of a prophylactic measure itself.360 Only the 
plaintiffs in the original case may sue for contempt if a 
defendant fails to comply with ordered prophylactic 
measures.361 Plaintiffs in external actions must base their 
 
353. 518 U.S. at 351 (1996) ("Because Bounds did not create an abstract, 
freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot 
establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law 
library or legal assistance is subpar in some theoretical sense."). 
354. Id. 
355. Smith, 528 U.S. at 273. 
356. Id. at 265, 272-74, 286-88. 
357. E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. 
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 
406, 420 (1977). 
358. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Columbus Bd. of 
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman 433 U.S. 
406 (1977); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. 
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976). 
359. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 383. 
360. See, e.g., Smith, 528 U.S. at 265; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 
(1996). Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001) (denying claim 
brought for failure to comply with administrative agency's prophylactic 
measure rather than for discrimination). 
361. The prophylactic remedy as a type of injunctive relief acts in personam 
upon the defendant and requires compliance under threat of contempt. SHOBEN 
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cause of action on the attendant constitutional, statutory, or 
common law right.362 While prophylactic remedies help 
explain the attendant right, they do not function as an 
independent right themselves. 
Prophylactic remedies have served as interpretative 
shorthand for finding a legal violation in subsequent 
cases.363 While some have viewed this as evidence of 
prophylaxis converting to a right,364 its shorthand use is 
merely the result of the regular operation of legal precedent 
in subsequent cases.365 Courts utilize the remedial decision 
with respect to prophylaxis to inform their decisions on 
liability and remedies in subsequent, unrelated cases. For 
example, if X, Y, and Z have been adopted as prophylactic 
measures to remedy a constitutional violation in other 
cases, then the absence of those actions by a defendant may 
suggest inferentially that harm was not prevented, i.e. that 
a violation occurred.366 Conversely, the prophylactic remedy 
may operate as a safe harbor for defendants in subsequent, 
unrelated cases, allowing them to demonstrate their good 
faith or lack of contribution to the violation of law.367 This is 
because showing that an alleged wrongdoer took measures 
known to avoid harm suggests circumstantially that it is 
not at fault for any resulting harm.368 Thus, prophylactic 
remedies are useful legal precedent to decide similar cases 
in the future. However, the line of precedential use is 
crossed when litigants assert a right to the prophylaxis 
 
& TABB, supra note 1, at 246; LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 237-38. 
362. E.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350-52. 
363. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 382. 
364. See Klein, supra note 22, 1035-37. 
365. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 382-83 (explaining in 
depth how prophylactic remedies operate as precedent in subsequent cases). 
366. Thus, prophylactic remedies entered in a case sometimes serve as 
detection standards for violations in subsequent cases. See id. at 383, 386; 
Caminker, supra note 15, at 1-2; Klein, supra note 22, at 1037. 
367. Klein, supra note 22, at 1033, 1044 ("[A] '. . . safe harbor rule' is a 
judicially created procedure, that if properly followed by the government actor, 
insulates the government from argument that the constitutional right was 
violated."). E.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, 528 (1999) 
(establishing a safe harbor for employers against imposition of punitive 
damages for sexual harassment through compliance with prophylactic 
measures of adoption of anti-harassment policies). 
368. E.g., Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 528; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775 (1998) (identifying affirmative defense for defendant employer who 
promulgates anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure as demonstrating 
reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment). 
 2004] THE PROPHYLACTIC REMEDY 179 
itself. 
The conclusion that prophylaxis is not a right itself 
evaporates decades of misguided criticism of prophylactic 
relief.369 Courts are not creating new rights through 
prophylaxis, but rather, are interpreting the legal right by 
example. The courts are choosing the remedial measures 
necessary to translate the abstract rights into accessible 
and practical meaning. The practical meaning conveyed by 
orders directing defendants' conduct falls within the 
common, accepted power of the court to interpret legal 
rights and craft equitable relief.370 Therefore, as the 
emerging consensus seems to acknowledge, there is nothing 
shocking or even questionable about the use of prophylactic 
relief.371 
B. Functional Need to Implement Rights 
Prophylactic remedies are also needed to ensure the 
implementation of the right.372 All remedies function 
instrumentally to implement the descriptive right.373 Yet 
prophylactic remedies particularly help address hurdles to 
effective implementation caused by general orders that 
facilitate confusion and resistance by defendants.374 
 
369. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 382. 
370. See id. at 376-82 (exploring the judicial remedial power to impose 
prophylactic remedies); Strauss, supra note 15, at 204-08 (explaining the 
legitimacy of prophylaxis as just one type of ubiquitous interpretive rule); 
Caminker, supra note 15, at 2, 7, 22 (arguing prophylaxis is "straightforward 
exercise of [legitimate] judicial power to interpret" rights). Cf. Monaghan, supra 
note 15, at 2-3, 21-23 (grounding the legitimacy of judicial prophylaxis in the 
court's "constitutional common law" authority to impose implementing rules of 
"substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and 
authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions."). 
371. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedies, supra note 1, at 363-70; Caminker, 
supra note 15, at 25; Dorf & Friedman, supra note 15, at 73 n.47; Landsberg, 
supra note 2, at 976. 
372. SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 679; Justice, supra note 9, at 1-2; Fallon, 
supra note 22, at 137-39. 
373. LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 1; Gewirtz, supra note 328, at 587 ("The 
function of a remedy is to 'realize' a legal norm, to make it a 'living truth.'"). See 
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997) ("A crucial mission of the court is to implement the 
Constitution successfully. . . . The Court's role in implementing the 
Constitution . . . is the central focus of this forward."). 
374. Monaghan, supra note 15, at 21 (arguing that prophylaxis might be 
required where "there is a substantial danger that a more finely tuned rule may 
be subverted in its administration by unsympathetic courts, juries, or public 
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Prophylactic relief counters the lack of compliance with an 
adjudicated right and its instrumental remedy by 1) 
avoiding the defendants' resistance to the right by 
mandating specific change, 2) providing clear notice to the 
defendants of expected behavior, and 3) ensuring the 
practical enforcement of the order by the court.375 
As Professor Gewirtz explained twenty years ago in his 
classic piece, Remedies and Resistance, specific remedial 
decrees permit the court to address the defendants' 
resistance on both philosophical and practical levels.376 The 
specific measures eliminate the defendants' discretion to 
avoid the practical change necessary to implement the 
right, thereby ensuring a higher level of remedial 
effectiveness.377 Gewirtz demonstrated his point using the 
desegregation cases.378 In some cases, the school defendants 
resisted the declared right to be free from segregation.379 By 
imposing specific relief, the courts countered this resistance 
to the right by mandating specific action rather than 
requiring defendants to act against a strong philosophical 
disbelief.380 In other cases, the defendants' resistance was 
 
officials."). 
375. See Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 679 (awarding prophylactic relief is 
necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of the right by the court and to 
achieve compliance from resistant defendants who could take advantage of the 
uncertainty in more general orders). 
376. Gewirtz, supra note 328, at 587. 
377. Id. 
378. Id. at 587-88, 609 (addressing the problem of white resistance to 
desegregation evidenced by white flight from public schools, violence, boycotts, 
hostility, and foot-dragging). 
379. Id. at 588 (describing the relentless and persistent failure of 
defendants to accept change and act in good faith); id. at 593 n.16 ("Criticism of 
a remedy, therefore, may reflect criticism of the underlying right."); Frank 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Judicial Power in Ordering Remedies: Civil Rights 
and Remedies, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 103 (1991) ("When we hear an 
objection to the remedy, it is almost always a disguised objection to the 
definition of what is due, and not to the methods used to apply the balm."); see 
also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971) 
(describing the sixteen years of deliberate resistance and lack of good faith 
implementation of Court's mandate in Brown to end segregation). 
380. Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 9 ("Morales illustrates an old adage: If 
you are confronted with a refractory mule, in order to get its attention, you need 
to hit it—hard—right between the eyes. In Morales, the recalcitrant state 
institution was stimulated to action by the attention-getting, detailed, remedial 
order."); id. at 9-10 (describing prophylactic relief issued in Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 
F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980): "I ordered relief which has been justly described 
as 'more comprehensive and specific than any other prison order ever issued by 
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to the practical externalities of the remedy such as the 
imposition of financial costs or assumption of unpopular 
social obligations like student busing.381 The specificity of 
prophylactic measures transfers the onus of the remedial 
obligations from the defendants to the court, thereby 
deflecting the political fallout from unpopular change.382 
Thus by the time of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, the Court recognized that its general 
commands of eliminating segregation were ineffective at 
preventing unconstitutional treatment.383 It therefore 
adopted in Swann prophylactic measures of busing, ratios, 
and gerrymandered attendance zones proactively to counter 
the defendants' resistance to the theory and practice of 
constitutionally-required desegregation.384 
Federal judge William Justice similarly described his 
 
a federal court.' The relief included details as specific as the amount of exercise 
to be permitted to inmates, the number of guards assigned to a unit, and the 
space allowance for prisoners housed in dormitories. The specificity to the order 
resulted from the truly active and fanatical opposition of the defendants in the 
pre-trial, trial, and post-trial phases of the case."). 
381. See Gewirtz, supra note 328, at 599-601; e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-29; 
DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002) (DeRolph IV) (defendant resisting 
order to fix and "overhaul" state system of funding public education on grounds 
of lack of funds and aversion to raising taxes). The Ohio Supreme Court's 
failure to impose prophylactic remedies in the school funding case, DeRolph IV, 
demonstrates the defendants' ability to evade compliance when they fail to 
accept the legitimacy of the adjudicated right or the ordered remedy. In 
DeRolph I in 1997, the Supreme Court declared the state's funding system for 
public education unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution's guarantee of a 
thorough and efficient education and ordered a total "overhaul" of the system. 
677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). Yet the state took no action to change the funding 
system. It repeatedly appealed to the Court on philosophical and practical 
reasons (lack of funds), and each time the Court reaffirmed its holding. DeRolph 
v. State (DeRolph II), 678 N.E.2d 886 (1997); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph III), 
754 N.E.2d 1184 (2001); DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d 529.  However, the Court 
never imposed specific prophylactic measures nor imposed contempt penalties 
to counter the defendants' resistance. Instead, a worn-down, and differently 
constituted Supreme Court finally issued a writ of prohibition freezing all relief 
in the case. See State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003). 
382. E.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-29; Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51-52 
(1990) (upholding order to enjoin state tax collection authorities from denying 
adequate budget to school district needed to remedy segregation). Indeed in 
Missouri v. Jenkins, the school defendant itself became essentially a plaintiff 
seeking to garner the court's power to effectuate change that the school itself 
admitted was required, but was blocked by financial, social, and political 
opposition. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 18, at 487-88, 495. 
383. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-29. 
384. See id. at 22-30. 
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rationale for imposing prophylactic relief in institutional 
cases to counter the defendants' resistance: 
[I]t should be emphasized that when confronted with an obstinate, 
obdurate and unregenerate defendant, a more detailed remedy is 
needed. If a decree is only in general terms, such a defendant will 
find it easy to disobey and defy the decree without fear of 
contempt, by making the contention that the order is too vague to 
guide future conduct. In such instances, a court must "ratchet-
down" on the defendant, by successive, more detailed 
supplemental decrees, until compliance is eventually achieved. 
Therefore, I firmly believe that when a defendant exhibits a 
stubborn and perverse resistance to change, extensive court-
ordered relief is both necessary and proper.385 
The same need for assurances of effectiveness against 
the defendants' resistance can be found in the abortion 
protest cases of the mid-90s.386 In those cases, the 
defendant protestors resisted the rights of the plaintiffs to 
choose abortions and resisted court orders to stop blocking 
those abortions.387 Indeed, in both cases, the court had 
documentation of the defendants' resistance.388 In Madsen 
v. Women's Health Center, the protestors had repeatedly 
disobeyed a prior injunction issued by the judge prohibiting 
them from "blockading and denying access to the clinic."389 
In Schenck, the abortion protestors had violated a 
temporary restraining order prohibiting their blockading, 
and had engaged in similar illegal behavior at other times, 
thereby demonstrating their propensity to violate a general 
preventive order.390 The specific, objective measures gave 
the defendants in both cases less room for avoidance with 
 
385. Justice Speech, supra note 14, at 7. 
386. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. 
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
387. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 365; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758. 
388. See Schenck, 519 U.S. 365-66; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758. Similarly, in 
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court similarly supported the validity 
of the prophylactic remedy on the basis of the need to counter the prison 
defendants' "long and unhappy history" of unconstitutional prison conditions. 
Id. at 687. The unconstitutional conditions in the Arkansas prison system 
characterized by the district court as "a dark and evil world completely alien to 
the free world" had persisted for decades. Id. In the specific litigation phase in 
Hutto itself, the conditions found to be unconstitutional remained uncured for 
at least three years. See id. at 684. 
389. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758. 
390. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 365, 368, 380. 
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the declared right of the plaintiffs and thus facilitated the 
greatest possible level of effectiveness of the court's order.391 
At a second level, prophylactic relief ensures the 
practical enforcement of the right by providing the 
defendant with clear notice of expected behavior.392 For 
example, by specifying that prohibiting discrimination 
means establishing corporate anti-discrimination policies, 
procedures, and training, the court avoids confusion and 
uncertainty on the part of defendants.393 The certainty 
gives defendants the freedom to continue their routine 
business practices without inhibition or fear that such 
conduct might violate an existing injunction.394 Moreover, 
the certainty of prophylactic measures protects defendants 
against exposure to contempt punishment for violating a 
vague or confusing order.395 This advantage provided by the 
 
391. See Gewirtz, supra note 328, at 596 (explaining that while no remedial 
methods can guarantee success, a judge can reduce the risk of ineffectiveness by 
imposing prophylactic measures such as monitoring compliance, issuing specific 
decrees, and requiring specific procedures and programs.). 
392. Justice, supra note 9, at 50 ("[W]hen specificity is present, it can 
usually be traced to considerations of efficacy and sometimes to general 
considerations of fairness (such as notice)."). 
393. Id. ("The court may also find it necessary and appropriate to be quite 
specific in these directives, either as a way of minimizing the risk of evasion or 
as a way of helping the bureaucratic officers know what is expected of them."); 
Cf. Int'l. Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Phila. Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 
(1967) ("We do not deal here with a violation of a court order by one who fully 
understands its meaning but chooses to ignore its mandate. We deal instead 
with acts alleged to violate a decree that can only be described as unintelligible. 
The most fundamental postulates of our legal order forbid the imposition of a 
penalty for disobeying a command that defies comprehension. Reversed."); 
Meyer v. Brown & Root Const. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981). ("An 
injunction must simply be framed so that those enjoined will know what 
conduct the court has prohibited.") (quoting Int'l. Longshoremen's Ass'n, 389 
U.S. at 76). 
394. See Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 167 F.3d 15, 29 (1st Cir. 1998) 
("The Commission claims that it is unsure what is and is not permissible, and it 
implies that this uncertainty inhibits its ability to carry out its ordinary rate-
regulation responsibilities vis-a-vis the utilities— responsibilities that certainly 
continue at the present time."); cf. Russell C. House Transfer & Stor. Co. v. 
United States, 189 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1951) (holding that "no decree should be so 
broad as to place the entire conduct of one's business under jeopardy of 
punishment for contempt for violating a general injunction."). 
395. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 439 (1976) 
("Because of the rightly serious view courts have traditionally taken of 
violations of injunctive orders, and because of the severity of punishment which 
may be imposed for such violation, such orders must in compliance with Rule 65 
be specific and reasonably detailed."). 
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prophylactic remedy of certainty is in fact a requirement of 
valid injunctive relief.396 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 
and the corresponding common law rules mandate the 
protection of defendants' rights by specific injunctions.397 
The courts emphasize that specific injunctions are required 
to provide defendants with information as to what is 
required so as to avoid the serious consequences of 
contempt.398 Prophylactic remedies thus protect defendants' 
rights while also facilitating compliance with needed relief. 
Finally, the specificity of the prophylactic measures 
enables the practical enforcement of the injunction against 
the defendant.399 For example, a prophylactic remedy 
requiring defendants to stay 30 or 36 feet away from clinic 
 
396. Fla. Ass'n of Rehabilitation Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health and 
Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d at 1223 (11th Cir. 2000) ("An injunction must be 
framed so that those enjoined know exactly what conduct the court has 
prohibited and what steps they must take to conform their conduct to the law."). 
397. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d) ("Every order granting an injunction and every 
restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in 
terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint 
or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained"); See Fla. Ass'n, 225 
F.3d at 1223 ("The specificity requirement of Rule 65(d) is no mere technicality; 
'[the] command of specificity is a reflection of the seriousness of the 
consequences which may flow from a violation of an injunctive order.'"); Burton 
v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1200 (11th Cir. 1999) ("This specificity 
requirement is necessary "to protect those who are enjoined 'by informing them 
of what they are called upon to do or to refrain from doing in order to comply 
with the injunction or restraining order.'") (quoting Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 
78 F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996); accord Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 
F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1978). 
398. See Spangler, 427 U.S. at 438-39; Payne, 565 F.2d at 897 ("This 
command of specificity is a reflection of the seriousness of the consequences 
which may flow from a violation of an injunctive order."); Ala. Nursing Home 
Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1980) ("This requirement of 
specificity, 'based in part on notions of basic fairness, ensures that individuals 
against whom an injunction is directed receive explicit notice of the precise 
conduct that is outlawed.'"). As explained in Wright & Miller's treatise of civil 
procedure: Rule 65 serves to "protect those who are enjoined by informing them 
of what they are called upon to do or to refrain from doing in order to comply 
with the injunction or restraining order. As a result, one of the principal abuses 
of the pre-federal rules practice—the entry of injunctions that were so vague 
that defendant was at a loss to determine what he had been restrained from 
doing—is avoided. The drafting standard established by Rule 65(d) is that an 
ordinary person reading the court's order should be able to ascertain from the 
document itself exactly what conduct is proscribed." 11A WRIGHT, MILLER & 
MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 2d § 2955 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
399. See Schoenbrod, supra note 5, at 679. 
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property builds in ease of enforcement as contrasted with a 
more general order prohibiting "blockading" access to the 
property.400 The court does not have to determine on a 
motion for contempt whether the defendant blocked access 
to the clinic or obstructed a patient's right to privacy, but 
simply whether the defendant was 34 or 38 feet away from 
the clinic. And the police on the front lines of enforcement 
can implement the order using the hard objective criteria of 
number of feet rather than the soft subjective meaning of 
"blockading." Prophylaxis thus provides needed objectivity 
to the amorphous areas of intangible rights and equitable 
relief that allows courts to hold defendants accountable. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to demystify the 
prophylactic remedy. Its goal has been to demonstrate the 
principled foundation of prophylactic relief in order to 
dispel the working assumption of prophylaxis as 
illegitimate judicial activism. The term "prophylactic" has 
become a legal term of art comprised of precise meaning 
and power. This meaning is assumed to be part of the 
common knowledge of the lawyer, and indeed, the concept 
of prophylaxis has become, perhaps unwittingly, deeply 
engrained in our jurisprudence. By fleshing out the 
theoretical and doctrinal basis for the remedy, this Article 
has hoped to advance the continued and appropriate use of 
this powerful equitable remedy. 
 
 
400. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 380 (1997); 
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73 (1994). 
